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When the government asked itself how to rebuild the country,
it looked for foundations, but found only sand. It decided that
the only solution was justice. Bare justice, to suit all
Rwandans.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Within this Article I seek to develop a feminist legal theory of jus-
tice, by questioning the ability of traditional legal strategies to facili-
tate justice and identifying underlying principles that contribute to a
more inclusive and holistic form of justice. Secondly, I apply this the-
ory to the situation of women victims of sexual violence in post-geno-
cide Rwanda, in an effort to explore how these principles can
contribute to a realization of justice that empowers women.
In Part II of this Article, I seek to develop a set of principles un-
derlying a feminist reconceptualization of justice. This endeavour is a
three-step process: First, I seek to provide an historical context and
perspective on the ideological and organizational tenets of feminist le-
gal theory as such can contribute to the (re)construction of an inclu-
sive, diverse, vital form of justice. Secondly, I hold current legal
operatives, particularly criminal procedure and rules of evidence, to
the light of scrutiny for masculine universals and feminine specifici-
ties, as those laws are embodied as such in substance and form.
Thirdly, using a variety of branches of feminist theory, I discuss alter-
native ways of thinking about legal regimes in the interest of seeking
a more feminist, inclusive, diversified, and vital conceptualization of
justice. I conclude this Part with the identification of five principles
that serve as the foundation for a feminist theory of justice.
In Part III of this Article, I apply these principles to the situation
of women victims of sexual violence committed during the genocide in
Rwanda. The analysis begins with a discussion of what is, in fact, the
situation of women victims of sexual violence in Rwanda. Such discus-
sion includes a brief history of genocidal events, particularly those re-
lated to the commission of crimes of systematic sexual violence, and
an abbreviated discussion of the development of crimes of sexual vio-
lence in international law. In the third section of Part III, I apply the
five foundational principles to specific legal structures and operatives
1. GACACA: LIVING TOGETHER AGAIN IN RWANDA? (Dominant 7/Gacaca Produc-
tions 2002) [hereinafter GACACA].
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in post-conflict Rwanda. This application seeks to engage a critical
analysis of how these structures and operatives do or do not contribute
to justice for women victims of sexual violence.
II. A FEMINIST RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF JUSTICE
We need theory that can analyze the workings of patriarchy
in all its manifestations - ideological, institutional, organiza-
tional, subjective - accounting not only for continuities but
also for change over time. We need theory that will let us
think in terms of pluralities and diversities rather than of
unities and universals. We need theory that will break the
conceptual hold, at least, of those long traditions of (Western)
philosophy that have systematically and repeatedly con-
strued the world hierarchically in terms of masculine univer-
sals and feminine specificities. We need theory that will
enable us to articulate alternative ways of thinking about
(and thus acting upon) gender without either simply revers-
ing the old hierarchies or confirming them. And we need the-
ory that will be useful and relevant for political practice. 2
What do feminist theories have to contribute to a reconceptualiza-
tion of justice? This title, this endeavour, is one fraught with peril, as
I try not only to recapitulate a variety of feminist theories, modern
and historical, in ways that are inevitably less nuanced than the theo-
ries themselves, (and make necessary omissions), but also as I at-
tempt to identify some basic tenets of justice as it must be
reconceptualized in a holistic manner and glean, from the body of fem-
inist legal theory as a whole, a perspective on the concept of justice
and the law which provides its supporting framework. In this Article,
I posit-in light of history, in light of the methods in which law is
based on a masculine subject, and in light of several branches of con-
temporary feminist theory-that a feminist reconceptualization of jus-
tice includes the following characteristics: (1) an emphasis on context
while sustaining a commitment to regulative legal principles; (2) an
acknowledgment of existent inequalities; (3) consideration of un-
chosen relationships; (4) an emphasis on mutual interdependence; and
(5) a recognition of collective values and societal responsibilities.
A. JUSTICE RECONSIDERED
Certainly, a thorough explication of the definition and application
of the term "justice" is crucial for an article that seeks to reconceptual-
2. Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the uses of Post-
structuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 33 (1988), reprinted in FEMI-
NIST LEGAL THEORY I: FOUNDATIONS AND OUTLOOKS 261 (Frances E. Olsen ed., 1995)
[hereinafter FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY I].
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ize justice according to feminist theory. In this regard, it is most help-
ful to call upon deconstruction for this task. Justice, according to
Merriam-Webster's dictionary, is defined as:
the maintenance or administration of what is just especially
by the impartial adjustment of conflicting claims or the as-
signment of merited rewards or punishments; the adminis-
tration of law; especially: the establishment or determination
of rights according to the rules of law or equity; the quality of
being just, impartial, or fair; the principle or ideal of just
dealing or right action; conformity to this principle or ideal;
* . .conformity to truth, fact, or reason.3
As pointed out by Samuel Weber, a professor at Northwestern Univer-
sity and one of the leading scholars in philosophy and critical theory,
what is just is thus defined in terms of right, rightfulness and right-
eousness, but also as the implementation of this right, including reali-
zation, application, enforcement, and sanction; justice is both an
ethical principle and a legal institution. 4
Conceptions of justice and law have historically been viewed as
being necessarily removed from the particulars of context. Law is ab-
stract, law is universal, law is "this celestial voice that dictates to each
citizen the precepts of public reason, and teaches him to follow the
maxims of his own judgment and not to be incessantly in contradiction
with himself. The laws are the driving force .. .of the body politic." 5
Law has historically been considered to be representative of a general
will which is radically distinct from all particularity and individuality,
as reflected by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his work Social Contract:
... [T]he general will, to be true to itself, must be general in
its object as well as in its essence; that it should have its point
of departure in the whole in order to return to the whole, and
that it loses its natural rectitude once it stoops to (tombe sur)
an individual and determinate subject. 6
Rousseau fails to consider that justice, however, at its heart is
natural and organic, both constituted by and constitutive of its sub-
jects. While he addresses the relationship between the public and the
private, he views this relationship as a social pact that gives the body
3. Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary (last visited
May 28, 2008).
4. Samuel Weber, In the Name of the Law, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBII-
ITY OF JUSTICE 232, 233 (Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson eds.,
1992).
5. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OEUVRES COMPLtTES 310 (Bernard Gagnebin & Mar-
cel Raymond eds., 1959).
6. Id. at 309-10.
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politic absolute power over its members, 7 and betrays, in this analy-
sis, a hierarchical and dualistic approach to law, a "radical heteroge-
neity" between the individual and general in society that cannot be
construed in natural, organic terms.8 Weber notes a concession made
by Rousseau in this formulation, as he explains the inability of the
general will to judge particular cases as a result of the lack of a ter-
tium comparationis: "'[in judging of what is not us, we have no true
principle of equity to guide us.'" 9
Weber notes that "it is this essential but enigmatic mediation be-
tween public and private spheres that the law is designed to estab-
lish."10 Rousseau emphasizes that law must simultaneously be
general and allow for a certain particularization to be applied to indi-
vidual cases. Paul de Man, noted deconstructionist theorist and liter-
ary critic, comments that "no law is a law unless it also applies to
particular individuals. It cannot be left hanging in the air, in the ab-
straction of its generality."" It is that space I wish to explore within
Part II of this Article-the interdependency of general and particular
at the crossroads of justice, including both right and the laws that im-
plement that right, in an effort to seek a feminist reconceptualization
of the same. In this effort, I enlist history, law, and theory. First, we
turn to history.
B. THE HISTORY OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY ILLUMINATES A
PROGRESSION FROM A LIBERAL EMPHASIS ON EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY TO AN INCREASING CONTEXTUALIZATION OF LEGAL
SUBJECTS.
As a vital movement comprised, notably, of a wide variation in not
only objective but also method, feminism has a colourful history. I of-
fer this history for discussion for two reasons: First, in order to com-
prehend fully the issues at stake with a sense of perspective, it is
crucial to understand the theoretical and epistemological context
within which feminist legal theory has developed. Secondly, as one
historian has noted, "there is an almost religious faith in the ability of
history to make everything coherent."1 2 As such, a review of history
7. See id. at 305-06 (discussing the relationship between the public and private
spheres).
8. Weber, supra note 4, at 239.
9. Id. at 240 (quoting ROUSSEAU, supra note 5, at 306).
10. Id. at 243.
11. PAUL DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING 269 (1979); see also id. at 238-45 (noting
the necessary particularity of law).
12. Ellen C. Dubois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKinnon &
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversa-
tion, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 64 (1985), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY I, supra note
2, at 143, 196.
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can illuminate patterns and (re)emerging issues that may have taken
on different forms in the past. 13
In the late eighteenth century, feminists premised legal reform
efforts on two distinct channels of thought; Ellen DuBois, historian
and professor at Northwestern University, terms these positions the
"egalitarian-feminist" and the "domestic-feminist" positions.14 The
egalitarian-feminist argument was based on the belief that men and
women share a common humanity, and that the denial of this common
humanity to women resulted in an unfair apportionment of rights,
privileges, duties, and resources in favour of men. The domestic-femi-
nist position, instead, was based on the idea that women are different
from men, arguing that, by insisting that women are the same as men,
women will therefore be regarded as inferior versions of men. 15
These two positions interact in ways that maintain relevance to-
day. Egalitarian feminism gave rise to fights for equality of education,
political participation, and suffrage, and dominated the feminist
movement until approximately 1860 or 1870, at which time domestic
feminism gained a stronghold and, eventually, led to suffragist victo-
ries based on the premise that women had something different to con-
tribute to the political arena-contributions which were both valuable
and distinct from those of men. 16 Today, these positions have evolved
into what are often regarded as liberal feminism and difference
feminism.
1. Liberal Feminism sought to achieve equality of opportunity as
enshrined in the law.
The liberal feminist movement resulted from a recognition, after
the political movements of the nineteenth century, that women were
excluded from the community of legal subjects in subtler and more
indirect ways, ways in which the constitution of legal rules and catego-
ries excluded or disadvantaged women. 17 Liberal feminism gave
birth, furthermore, to an explication of the differences and distinctions
between categories of sex and gender.' 8 In this way, liberal feminists
13. See id. at 65 (noting the relevance of history to contemporary analysis).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 66.
17. See Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist
Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 4 (1987), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THE-
ORY I, supra note 2, at 3, 6 (placing liberal feminism in context); NICOLA LACEY, Feminist
Legal Theory beyond Neutrality, in UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL
AND SOCIAL THEORY 188, 189 (1998) (discussing liberal feminism).
18. Dalton, supra note 17; LACEY, supra note 17. See also Stevi Jackson, Theoris-
ing Gender and Sexuality, in CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THEORIES 131 (Stevi Jackson &
Jackie Jones eds., 1998).
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sought to undermine perceived "natural" differences between men and
women, arguing from a position of social constructionism: If the social
meanings of gender are contingent, then those meanings could no
longer justify differential treatment.19 Furthermore, and more impor-
tantly, liberal feminists argued by extension that social meanings
themselves could be changed by changing powerful social practices
such as law.
20
The central problem for liberal feminism was that liberal femi-
nism was essentially "a strategy of assimilation of women to a stan-
dard set by and for men."2 1 As feminist legal theorist Katherine
19. LACEY, supra note 17, at 190. Liberal feminism was instrumental in address-
ing legal reform efforts in rape laws, child custody laws, part-time work provisions, and
marital property. Id. As Lacey notes, the politics themselves were easy; they were the
same politics that informed the ideological self-conception of the liberal and democratic
legal order that took itself to be criticizing:
[I]f as a liberal society, you profess to accord women the full rights of citizen-
ship, then you are logically committed to attending to the various ways in
which your legal framework in fact falls short of this universalist ideal. Give
women the same rights and entitlements as you give to men; treat women
equally; dispense your justice even-handedly.
Id.
20. Id. at 189. See also Dalton, supra note 17, at 4. Legal reform efforts during
this time were reflective of this liberal position and focused on non-discrimination ef-
forts. See Sex Discrimination Act (SDA), 1975, c. 65 (Eng.). Feminists challenged dis-
criminatory laws and made efforts to abolish discrimination on the basis of sex. See id.
Legal reforms took place in many domestic systems in both the public and private sec-
tors. See id. Britain's Sex Discrimination Act is a good example of the fruits of liberal
feminism, which was passed in 1975 and prohibits not discrimination against women
but discrimination based on grounds of sex. See id. Both the U.S. Constitution and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court for the first
time in the 1970s to apply to distinctions on the basis of sex, enabling women (and men)
to gain access to rights and privileges theretofore accorded only to men (or women). See
U.S. CONST. amend. XJV; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971),
the U.S. Supreme Court applied Title VII to sex discrimination cases as a matter of first
impression, and in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court first invalidated a sex-
based classification on constitutional grounds. During this time, the U.S. Supreme
Court also decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a landmark decision on abortion
which sparked a legal and political controversy that continues today. For a comprehen-
sive discussion, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, William T. Joyner Lecture on Constitutional Law at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina School of Law (April 6, 1984), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY I, supra note 2, at 281.
21. LACEY, supra note 17, at 191. Often, liberal feminism is viewed, in retrospect,
as a movement that sought formal as opposed to substantive equality. Id. However,
this claim loses sight of the fact that liberalism, even in its early stages, went far beyond
simple demands for formal equality. Id. Lacey notes that liberal feminism was con-
cerned not simply with the formal surfaces of law but with its impact; for example, in
deciding what would count as equal treatment, the present effects of past discrimina-
tion were taken into account. Id. Liberalism is also criticized as being a movement that
is premised on "sameness," a mischaracterization that glosses over the fact that liberal
theorists, including "mainstream" liberal theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, have been
concerned to emphasize equality as 'treatment as equal' rather than "equal treatment."
[Vol. 41
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O'Donovan has stated, within liberal feminism was a general ten-
dency to assume that a woman could be (and should be?) more like a
man.22 As such, the legal subjecthood to which women were assimi-
lated under liberal feminism was implicitly male and the very meth-
ods of legal practice, masculine. Difference feminism shifted this
focus, from the instrumental aspect of law to the symbolic, "beyond a
concern with the differential impact of laws on subjects pre-formed as
women and men to the recognition and explication of a more dynamic
role for law in constructing and underpinning gender hierarchies."2 3
Difference feminism examined the role of law as a discursive practice,
examining the messages about women and men that are transmitted
by law. It looked at the underlying conceptualizations of subjecthood
that are constructed as truths by the law, and into which the material
realities of women's and men's lives are inserted. It focuses on the
subtle role of law in categorizing and distinguishing its subjects,
'thinking beyond a law whose dominant mode is to fix its subjects'
sexual or other identities within rigid categories." 24
2. Difference feminism involves the dissection of legal form and
structure to uncover ways in which law situates its
subjects according to sex.
Within the rhetoric of difference feminism, feminist theorists be-
gan to examine the very maleness of the legal subject itself, arguing
that the paradigm legal subject was itself constructed in such a way as
to equate rational subjectivity with masculinity.2 5 This legal subject,
it is argued, has been construed as an individual abstracted from so-
cial context, from the context of its own body, from its affective ties
with others, and its dependence on others for its own identity.26
These qualities, combined with an emphasis on rationality and self-
control, make up a baseline masculine legal subject, where the femi-
nine subject is viewed as "other," and therefore, consequently,
lesser. 27
This argument has at its base an assertion of the power of certain
binary oppositions within Western thought: reason/emotion; self/
other; public/private; individual/community; mind/body; and male/fe-
male.28 According to this theory, each member of a given pair is de-
22. Id. at 192.
23. Id.




28. Id. at 193-94.
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fined-hierarchically-in opposition to the other.2 9 Therefore, "to the
extent ... that the conceptualization of subjects within legal doctrine,
and the insertion of embodied women and men into those frameworks
via legal discourse, are genuinely marked by the features of reason
and individuality and by the repression or forgetting of the body and
affectivity, and to the extent that these hallmarks of subjecthood are
elevated to the status of objectivity or universality, women will find
themselves constructed as non-standard, as other"30 in both form and
substance under the law.
Liberal feminism's successes had drawn women into a politics
whereby the positioning of gender neutrality was supposed to lead to
sexual equality. Difference feminism complicated matters immeasur-
ably, as law and liberal politics began to be viewed as not a solution,
but rather part of the problem.3 1 While liberal feminism could draw
on a wide range of normative and conceptual resources, difference
feminism saw those resources as marked by masculinity. Now, the
language of rights, justice, and equality was not nearly as straightfor-
ward, or even useful.3 2 Feminists have had to draw upon a broad
range of theories to explore the methods and forms by which law is
sexed, and to develop complex and sophisticated mechanisms to recast
the debate. In the next section of this Article, I examine this issue in
detail, looking at various ways in which law itself is sexed in structure
and method, including general characteristics that inhere within civil,
criminal, and international law concepts of the state. I will then dis-
cuss some of the theories that contribute to an understanding of, and
recasting of, this legal framework.
C. LAW, AT ITS PERIL, MARKS ITS SUBJECTS WITH DISTINCT SEXUAL
CHARACTERISTICS.
Legal frameworks have not only illuminated "the restrictive and
sexist views of our society," but also "legitimized and contributed to
them."3 3 This principle is particularly evident relative to laws on
crimes of sexual violence, as discussed below. Laws certainly do not
29. Id. at 194.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 17; see generally Elizabeth Frazer, Feminist Politi-
cal Theory, in CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THEORIES 50 (Stevi Jackson & Jackie Jones
eds., 1998) (discussing distinctions between difference feminism and liberal feminism).
32. Frazer, supra note 31, at 53; Jane Scoular, Feminist Jurisprudence, in CONTEM-
PORARY FEMINIST THEORIES 62 (Stevi Jackson & Jackie Jones eds., 1998). For an argu-
ment illuminating some of the problems with this approach with regard to human
rights and international law, see Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights of Women: National
and International Perspectives, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 840, 843 (1995).
33. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1093 (1986) [hereinafter Estrich,
Rape].
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reflect the position that rape is "a crime worse than death,"3 4 and the
fear and reluctance many women experience in identifying these most
personal violations of their bodily integrity and human dignity. In
fact, these laws often make it more difficult to prosecute than other
crimes. 35 In fact, legal reforms regarding rape victims often them-
selves perpetuate male domination within a dichotomous gender
hierarchy.3 6
Following a method of analysis developed by renown feminist le-
gal theorists Rosemary Hunter and Kathy Mack, this section will ex-
amine the sexing of the subject of formal adjudication by considering
among the following criteria: (1) the attributes of the subjects con-
structed by the legal rules; (2) the operation of assumptions about the
natural division of sex into two opposed categories; (3) elements of au-
tonomous masculine subject of Western liberal typology; (4) the rela-
tionship between assumed qualities of legal subjects and the material
lives of embodied women and men; and (5) the systematic differential
impact on male and female litigants.3 7
Procedural and evidentiary rules rely on archetypical cultural
categories of masculine and feminine in formal adjudication. The sub-
ject of formal adjudication has typically been characterized by self-
possession, self-knowledge, autonomy, abstraction, self-determining
status, and public action.38 He is a creature of reason, self-interested
and instrumental, and the possessor of rights.3 9 The constructed legal
subject, through efforts at neutrality and objectivity, necessarily sacri-
fices a degree of truth and justice in the process. By failing to ac-
knowledge context, failing to relate the general to the particular,
34. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVEs: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH 24 (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/re-
ports/1996/Rwanda.htm [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES]:
Josepha was 38 years old and living in Shyanda commune, Butare prefecture,
in 1994. Her family was attacked by the militia in April, 1994 and many were
killed. She hid in the sorghum fields, but was caught by the militia. They hit
her over the head, and took her by the arms and legs and threw her in the air.
She fell on the ground on top of some broken bottles. Then two of the militia
raped her. One of them has not been arrested and continues to live in Butare.
Josepha said, "rape is a crime worse than death." She has not returned to her
land or her house, but stays in a camp for widows with her one surviving
daughter.
Id.
35. See infra Part II.C.
36. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
37. Rosemary Hunter & Kathy Mack, Exclusion and Silence: Procedure and Evi-
dence, in SEXING THE SUBJECT OF LAW 171, 174 (Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens
eds., 1997).
38. Id. at 173; Ngaire Naffine, Sexing the Subject of Law, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE:
FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 23-25 (Margaret Thornton ed., 1996).
39. Hunter et al., supra note 37, at 173.
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failing to support the mutual interdependence of human beings, and
by failing to emphasize collective values, the subject of formal adjudi-
cation becomes very narrow. In the following section, we can see these
operatives at play, as we turn attention to the ways in which law ex-
cludes feminine legal subjects.
1. Civil procedure excludes feminine legal subjects by
decontextualizing injury and failing to take into account existing
inequalities and the situated subject.
Civil procedure excludes feminine legal subjects in a couple of dis-
tinct ways. The first condition, in fact, for being a legal subject is to
experience a certain kind of harm, defined in terms of a decontextual-
ized, individualized injury.40 Adjudication in the adversarial system
is suited best for a discrete injury or series of injuries.4 1 Often, the
types of injuries women experience, whether as part of a pattern of
sexual violence or discrimination, do not lend themselves to adjudica-
tion under this procedural requirement. Harms such as sexual har-
assment, sexual assault, domestic violence, and discrimination often
occur as part of a pattern of behaviour and/or a cumulative series of
events. 42 Specific incidents, stripped of an overall context, may lose
their force or even their legal cognizability in this realm. Equal oppor-
tunity law, for example, maintains the requirement that the injury be
personal and not social-that there be one plaintiff claiming an injury
from one identifiable discriminator with regard to a particular in-
stance of conduct.
This emphasis on decontextualized, individualized injury can ob-
scure social context and the systemic nature of a given harm. Su-
zanne Levitt, Professor of Law at Drake University, argues that sexed
injuries are largely invisible to the nearsighted eye of formal adjudica-
tion because legal harm "must be different from what is normal ... the
more pervasive or persistent an experience is ... the more likely the
experience will be incorporated into the background level of non-harm
... [H]arm is not harm when it occurs frequently. Pervasive harm is
not harm because it is pervasive."43
Civil procedure also requires a prompt, self-assertive, consistent
complaint. Because many of the sexed harms women suffer are not
the types of harms that have been historically legally cognizable, wo-
men may be less likely to view a claim as of right, and may, because of
40. Id. at 175-77.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 176.
43. Suzanne J. Levitt, Rethinking Harm: A Feminist Essay, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 531,
532 (1995). See also Hunter et al., supra note 37, at 177.
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delay or lack of assertiveness, be precluded from seeking a remedy. As
Hunter and Mack note, in a sexual violence context, this requirement
can create a catch-22 for the victim:
If a woman does make a claim, she presents herself as an au-
tonomous public actor. Immediately, the argument that she
can and should leave is raised, because leaving is what an
autonomous actor would do. If she does leave, however, she
knows she may suffer serious material and personal conse-
quences (loss of property, loss of employment, the possibility
of increased violence and loss of custody of children). Yet if
she accepts the legal construction of the good Woman of the
private sphere and stays .. .this may count against her as
contributory behaviour if she later decides to seek tort reme-
dies or criminal injuries compensation. 44
Because of the nature of the procedural requirement that legal
subjects be autonomous and assertive, combined with the traditional
construction of woman as dependent, women victims may experience,
quite literally, insult to injury-the experience of the injury itself,
combined with the insult of being unable to seek redress for that in-
jury in court.
2. Rules of evidence exclude female subjects by failing to address
situated subjects in their contexts, by basing judgments on
rationality and autonomy, and by failing to acknowledge existent
inequalities.
Like the rules of civil procedure, the rules of evidence also exclude
a feminine legal subject. As an example, we will look at two areas: (1)
rules relating to truth and immediacy; and (2) the emphasis on
universality. First, as Hunter and Mack note, the rules of evidence
rely heavily on the premise that "there is one truth about an event
which is most likely to be elicited at or close to the time of the event
[assuming] a subject who is able to observe and describe their (sic)
experience accurately and without fear or shame."45 The emphasis on
experience untainted by emotion is archetypically masculine in na-
ture, ignores the presence of inequalities within the context of rela-
tionships, and may prevent women from making successful claims,
particularly in the context of sexual violence.
According to the rules of evidence, a prompt complaint is evidence
of credibility, and a lapse of time may indicate fabrication.4 6 In M. v.
44. Hunter et al., supra note 37, at 179.
45. Id.
46. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 347 (1975)
(acknowledging a persistent view that women who fail to come forward immediately in
public are suspected of fabricating their stories); Estrich, supra note 33 (discussing the
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R., 4 7 for example, the High Court of Australia overturned a conviction
of a stepfather for sexual and indecent assault of his daughter, in part
because the daughter did not complain promptly to her mother and/or
stepmother.48 Despite the fact that the jury had deemed her testi-
mony credible, and the fact that the victim had confided in a school
friend at her earliest opportunity, the High Court invoked the prompt
complaint doctrine, adding a requirement that the victim complain
promptly to an authority.4 9
The prompt complaint doctrine also fails to account for victims'
fear of a "likelihood of disbelief by police, retaliation by the rapist, hos-
tility of family and support network, and the stress caused by the judi-
cial proceedings and stigma of being a public rape 'victim.'"' 50
Additionally, traditional defense doctrines often require that a woman
actively fight against the attack; if she does not, she may lose legal
protection against the rape.5 1
A second way the rules of evidence are marked by sex is in the
idea of universal, cognitive competence-that normal, ordinary, unbi-
ased people will assess the information presented and come to the
same conclusion. 52 Part of the problem in this area is that this assess-
ment of information involves both a project of logical deduction as well
as an application of common sense. The common sense, applied both
by judges and juries, reflect certain assumptions about legal subjects
and "privileges the understanding of the world of the group that has
dominated legal and public life: white, middle-class, heterosexual
"fresh complaint rule" and resultant difficulties for rape victims); Kathryn M. Stanchi,
The Paradox of the Fresh Complaint Rule, 37 B.C. L. REV. 441, 443-46 (1996) (providing
an historical analysis of the "fresh complaint rule" and legal support for the notion that
"silence after rape... impeaches the credibility of the complainant").
47. (1994) 181 C.L.R. 487.
48. M. v. R. (1994) 181 C.L.R. 487, 499.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric La.
beling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271, 1333 (1994). For a detailed discussion on the
reasons behind rape victims' reluctance to report or prosecute these crimes, see
CHARLES W. DEAN & MARY DEBRUYN-KoPs, THE CRIME AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE 63-
66 (1982). These evidentiary requirements result in fewer victims coming forward, re-
sulting in an even greater lack of judicial efficacy. See, e.g., THE LAW SOCIETY OF BRIT.
ISH COLUMBIA, GENDER EQUALITY IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 69 (1992) ("Many sexual
assaults are not reported. This is due, in part, to the victim's lack of confidence that the
justice system will support them.").
51. BROWNMILLER, supra note 46, at 360-61 (analyzing the argument that women
must forcefully resist an act of rape, and that cooperation may result in a loss of legal
protection); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 815 (1991) (remarking
that it is only in the context of a rape case that the law requires proof of actual resis-
tance); Estrich, Rape, supra note 33, at 1139 (discussing the ideas that corroboration of
rape requires proof of forceful resistance).
52. Hunter et al., supra note 37, at 181.
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males."5 3 When, in court, a judge states that "in the common experi-
ence, 'no' often subsequently means 'yes,'" that "common sense" is
drawn from myths about rape, not from the experiences of rape
survivors. 54
3. Criminal procedure excludes a feminine legal subject by failing
to acknowledge existent inequalities and collective societal values,
and by instead enshrining its subject with those very
inequalities.
Criminal procedure excludes a feminine legal subject by legitimiz-
ing existent inequalities under the law. Criminal procedure priori-
tizes the masculine legal subject in so far as it contains rules that
overwhelmingly privilege criminal defendants, particularly with re-
gard to special evidentiary rules for rape and sexual assault cases. 5 5
Such laws appear to have an underlying assumption that women have
the tendency to lie about rape.5 6 First, the laws of evidence and proce-
dure often presume that the female provoked the assault.5 7 For exam-
ple, where character and propensity evidence is generally
inadmissible, a woman's prior sexual history and reputation can be
admitted to both prove consent and to attack her credibility. 58 Also,
information such as a prior history of abuse is often not relevant to
establishing a recognized defense for battered women who kill their
partners. 59
53, Id. at 182.
54. R v. J. (SA Sup. Ct., Aug. 24, 1992). See also Hunter et al., supra note 37, at
182.
55. See Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished
Draft), 105 IAv. L. REV. 1045, 1049-51 (1992) (noting characteristics of criminal proce-
dure as exclusive of feminine legal subjects); LACEY, supra note 17, at 197-200 (discuss-
ing the importance of laws of procedure and evidence regarding rape); SUsAN S. M.
EDWARDS, FEMALE SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF CONSTRUCTS OF FEMALE SEXU.
ALITY AS THEY INFORM STATUTE AND LEGAL PROCEDURE (1981) (stating "procedural rules
have evolved with the protection of the defendant in mind.").
56. BROWNMILLER, supra note 46, at 369-74 (discussing how evidentiary assump-
tions that women have the tendency to lie about rape preclude many convictions).
57. EDWARDS, supra note 55 (positing that the laws of procedure and evidence per-
sist in presuming that the woman provoked the assault).
58. See DPP v. Boardman (1975) A.C. 421 (concerning admission of evidence
within the context of allegation of crimes); see generally LACEY, supra note 17, at 197-
200 (discussing admissibility of character and propensity evidence in sex cases).
59. Ian Leader-Elliot, Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation,
in SEXING THE SUBJECT OF LAW 149 (Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens eds., 1997).
See also Naffine, supra note 38, at 18-39 (discussing battered women's defense); Hunter
et al., supra note 37, at 186 (examining laws of procedure and evidence); see generally
LACEY, supra note 17, at 197-200 (noting the "sexed" nature of law).
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4. International law excludes a feminine legal subject by creating
an autonomous, individualized masculine model of the state as
its subject.
International law has traditionally operated on the basis of the
sovereign state as its subject. This operating principle can be seen in
treaties, in diplomatic issues, in humanitarian law, and in member-
ship in intergovernmental organizations. Charlesworth argues that
the character of the central subject of international law, the nation
state, is based upon a masculine model, making it difficult to re-
present women's interests in international legal discourse.
According to the Montevideo Convention, a state "as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a per-
manent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) ca-
pacity to enter into relations with other states."60 With regard to
population, international law is selective in the criteria it applies to
determine whether that population is sufficient for statehood. First,
traditional notions of citizenship had to do with property and military
service, and thus excluded women. 6 1 Secondly, while statehood has
been refused on the basis of racial discrimination,6 2 the population
requirement of a state can nonetheless be satisfied where the popula-
tion is comprised nearly exclusively of men, and where that popula-
tion is reproduced asexually, via recruitment-such as the Vatican.
The second requirement for statehood, that there be a defined ter-
ritory, presents the state as a unified and bounded entity. This con-
cept of boundary, it has been argued, skews perceptions because it
envisions the individual as detached from the collective. 6 3 It has fur-
ther been argued that the state is embodied physically with male
characteristics: it has no "natural" points of entry, and its bounded
nature makes forced entry a breach of international law. 64 Entities
that are not bounded in this way, such as many indigenous minority
60. MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, art. 1, Dec. 26,
1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933).
61. Hilary Charlesworth, The Sex of the State in International Law, in SEXING THE
SUBJECT OF LAW 258 (Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens eds., 1997) (citing V. Spike
Peterson, Security and Sovereign States, in GENDERED STATES: FEMINIST (RE)VISIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 34 (V. Spike Peterson ed., 1992)).
62. The United Nations General Assembly, for example, refused to acknowledge
the statehood of the Bantustans of South Africa based on the idea that those "home-
lands" were created "to consolidate the inhuman policies of apartheid, to destroy the
territorial integrity of the country, to perpetuate white minority domination and to dis-
possess the African people of South Africa of their inalienable rights." G.A. Res. 31/6A,
U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/22 (Oct. 26, 1976).
63. For a thorough discussion of these meanings of "boundary," see Jennifer Nedel-
sky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990).
64. Charlesworth, supra note 61, at 259.
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groups, are not considered to be subjects of international law and
maintain fewer rights under an international legal regime.
6 5
In the same way that the above two criteria are based on Western
liberal typology of masculinity, the final two criteria, that there is an
organized and effective government and that a state must have the
capacity to enter into relations with other states, depend heavily upon
a notion of state autonomy built upon isolation and separation and
speaking with one voice, obscuring diversity and notions of interde-
pendence. 66 It has been argued further that the idea of security in
international relations depends upon notions of self-help, autonomy,
and the seeking of power.6 7 The state, as depicted in international
law, with clear boundaries, a strong government and autonomy, em-
bodies a masculine legal subject and excludes the feminine.6 8
D. BREAKING THE CONCEPTUAL HOLDS: CURRENT FEMINIST THEORIES
DEMONSTRATE METHODS OF DISMANTLING THE ASSUMPTIONS LAW
MAKES ABOUT ITS LEGAL SUBJECTS AND PRESENT ALTERNATIVE
WAYS OF CONCEIVING A FEMINIST APPROACH TO JUSTICE.
We can see that, in both form and substance, law makes many
assumptions about its legal subjects. Traditionally, law has had as its
subject those individuals who have maintained economic, social, and
political power. As we seek to transform those power structures, and
in the interest of developing a holistic approach to justice, how can we
transform the framework of law to accommodate diverse (and some-
times divergent) interests? How can we, as gender historian Joan
Scott asked, "break the conceptual hold[s] ... that have systematically
and repeatedly construed the world hierarchically in terms of mascu-
line universals and feminine specificities" such that we can articulate
alternative ways of thinking about (and thus acting upon) gender
without either simply reversing the old hierarchies or confirming
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. J. Ann Tickner, Inadequate Providers? A Gendered Analysis of States and Se-
curity, in THE STATE IN TRANSITION: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE 125 (Joseph A.
Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis & Albert J. Paolini eds., 1995). When states are in need of
assistance or protection from other states, Tickner argues that the sexual identity shifts
and a state becomes imbued with feminine characteristics. For a discussion on this
issue, see id. at 129-31.
68. In addition to the four criteria considered here, under the Montevideo Conven-
tion, it is interesting to consider the other criteria that have developed for determina-
tions of statehood, such as those found in James Crawford's The Creation of States in
International Law, in which he argues that violations of norms ofjus cogens will affect
considerations of statehood. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1979). Notably, race discrimination, as mentioned in supra note 62 and
accompanying text, is one such norm. Sex discrimination, however, is not. Charles-
worth, supra note 61, at 264.
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them? 69 There are several theories that make significant contribu-
tions to this issue, four of which I discuss below: deconstruction;
postmodernism; communitarianism; and care.
1. Deconstruction breaks conceptual holds by demonstrating that
law is necessarily dependent upon, and reflective of, values.
Some theories have emphasized that it is only through a thorough
explication of how the gender hierarchy is perpetuated and intersects
with the law that one can understand fully women's demands for jus-
tice. Deconstruction meets law at the intersection between legal
rules, doctrine, and interpretation, in an explication of the conflicts,
contradictions, and indeterminacies that result. While many authors
tend to disagree about the scope and application of deconstruction, the
theory appears generally to proceed from the starting point that writ-
ing precedes speech, that every text refers to other texts, and that dis-
continuities between logic and rhetoric create disparities between the
intent of an author and the external constraints on meaning:
[iun the context of deconstruction, all texts (whether oral or
written) are writings that refer to other writings. A text is
not a pure presence that immediately and transparently
reveals a distinct. . . construction, every writing embodies a
failed attempt at reconciling identity and difference, unity
and diversity and self and other. A writing may give the im-
pression of having achieved the desired reconciliation, but
such impression can only be the product of ideological distor-
tion, suppression of difference or subordination of the other.70
Ronald Dworkin refers to a theory of law as integrity in his book,
Law's Empire.71 Under this theory, legal interpretation is an histori-
cally situated practice, necessarily connected to the past and creating
the chain of continuity for the future. 72 Legal interpretation, accord-
ing to Dworkin, is like authoring a chain novel, a work of collective
authorship with each chapter being written by a different author; each
of the authors must write within the constraints of the previously
written chapters and make sure that the chapter fits in with the
others, as part of the integrity of the novel as a whole. 73 Applying this
theory to acts of legal interpretation and application, a judge must
69. Scott, supra note 2, at 33.
70. Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indetermi-
nacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 152, 153 (Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carl-
son eds., 1992).
71. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986). See also id. at 155 (discussing the re-
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take decisions compatible with relevant historical judicial precedents
in the interest of preserving the integrity of law over time.
In my view, there is a gap in the chain of logic of Dworkin's the-
ory. While some theorists, including Alan Brudner and Michel Rosen-
feld, have asserted that Dworkin's theory fails because the criterion of
fit is too indeterminate to endow Dworkin's principle of integrity with
a sufficiently concrete meaning, I do not agree that it is the indetermi-
nacy that is Dworkin's failing.7 4 Rosenfeld argues that .'[e]ither the
measure of fit and integrity is based on some set of substantive values
such as those embedded in certain relevant judicial precedents, or it is
reducible to a purely formal and abstract notion that cannot be given
any non-arbitrary concrete instantiation.' 75 Rosenfeld premises this
assertion on the idea that .'[ilf fit and integrity depend upon particu-
lar substantive values-even if these values have been filtered
through the interpretive process involved in the attempted reconcilia-
tion of judicial precedents-then Dworkin's theory is ultimately sub-
ject to the same criticisms as those theories which select one set of
contested substantive extra-legal values over others or which posit
some such values as dominant and the remainder as subordinate.' 76
While Rosenfeld's conclusion is a logical one-that is, the principle of
integrity is either based on precedent substantive values or reducible
to a formal and abstract concept, and if it is based on precedent sub-
stantive values it is dependent upon that which it attempts to avoid-
I submit that it is not the subjectivity of law, as a whole, which is
objectionable; for is not law, as a whole, unable to extricate itself from
values? Is not our notion of justice a reflection of what is hopefully a
collective set of values, and a legal regime an operative framework
within which we can apply those values? Rather, it is precisely this
misconception, that it is possible to separate law from "extra-legal"
values, that is so crucial to the operation of a feminist theory of
justice.
Law itself is necessarily reflective of, and dependent upon, values.
Those values, historically, have been values of a very particular demo-
graphic. Gaining a holistic perspective on justice and its operating
(and operative) principles, necessarily requires an illumination of
what those values are, not in an attempt to extricate them, but rather
to explicate their origins, their meanings, and how they intersect with
all that has been excluded. It is crucial that we recognize that those
"extra-legal" values are not extra-legal at all, but pervasive in law's
74. But see Rosenfeld, supra note 70, at 154-56 (asserting that the criterion is too
indeterminate); Alan Brudner, The Ideality of Difference: Toward Objectivity in Legal
Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1156-57 (1990).
75. Rosenfeld, supra note 70, at 155.
76. Id. at 155-56.
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form and structure. Once we have recognized this connection and dis-
sected it for an exploration of all its parts, only then can we under-
stand how those parts fit together, and function, and how those parts
can be reformulated to be more representative and inclusive of collec-
tive interests.
Under Dworkin's theory of law as integrity, substantive values of
the community of legal actors are not removed from this process of
interpretation and application, but rather are imbedded in legal prece-
dents creating the parameters of the constraints within which the in-
terpreters must take decisions. Recognition of this phenomenon is
crucial to a feminist theory of justice. In fact, substantive values, like
it or not, have been enshrined in the foundations of law throughout its
history; the reason those values have not been recognized as such is
that those values have been particular to a very specific demographic,
a demographic of power that has been, by extension, exclusionary. We
must recognize the (omni)presence of substantive values in the law,
the inevitability of that presence, and, in fact, the very importance of
it, and then we must work to make those values in form and substance
reflective of a inclusionary whole.
2. Postmodernism breaks conceptual holds by dismantling notions
of universality and objectivity.
Within a context of substantial economic and social change in the
recent history of post-industrial countries, postmodernism is often
characterized by alienation, uncertainty, disenchantment, fragmenta-
tion, a loss of community, and, with it, a loss of stable identity. 7 7
Postmodernism, like deconstruction, locates human experience as in-
escapably within language. 78 Within the realm of feminist legal the-
ory, postmodernism serves as a launching pad for the analysis of legal
language as a situs for gender and sex hierarchies as they are en-
trenched in the foundations of society. Interpretive struggles over the
meaning of sex differences, thus, can 'impact on patriarchal legal
power.' 79 As Mary Joe Frug explains, '"Because sex differences are
semiotic-that is, constituted by a system of signs that we produce
and interpret-each of us inescapably produces herself within the
gender meaning system, although the meaning of gender is indetermi-
nate or undecidable. The dilemma of difference, which the liberal
77. LACEY, Community in Legal Theory, in UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS, supra note 17,
at 130.
78. Frug, supra note 55, at 1046. See also Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The
"Mystical Foundation of Authority," in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUS-
TICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson eds., 1992).
79. Frug, supra note 55, at 1046; Naffine & Owens, Sexing Law, in SEXING THE
SUBJECT OF LAw, supra note 37, at 3.
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equality guarantee seeks to avoid through neutrality, is
unavoidable."' 80
Postmodernism, unlike feminism, is not an activist movement
whose goals are ultimately emancipatory. However, postmodernism
has been invaluable in rejecting the notion of an "objective" law re-
flecting an independently existing reality, repudiating the pursuit of
universal, rational ethical principles.8 1 Just as feminism has argued
against a universalist notion, claiming that a universal, rational sub-
ject is inherently masculine, many feminist theorists have begun look-
ing for a feminine "space" outside of rationality and patriarchal
hierarchies, which follows well in line with postmodern thinking 8 2
As nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzche
stated in The Genealogy of Morals, "'there is only a perspectival know-
ing,"' a philosophy that has direct application to the critique at
hand.8 3 French philosopher and literary theorist Jean-Francois Ly-
otard, in his treatise on postmodernism, The Postmodern Condition,8 4
claims that rationalism is destined to fail because its "truths" only
make sense in terms of their own internal constructs, and therefore, it
cannot ground its own rational procedures and, as such, requires an-
other kind of discourse-customary knowledge-in order to achieve
this goal. Because customary knowledge is dependent and transitory,
dependent in part on issues of gender, race, or class, there can be no
universal rationalism. Instead, as literary theorist Patricia Waugh
comments, we see a '"conflation of the organic and the inorganic, of
science with art and of fictionality with fact,"' "'explod[ing] concepts of
subjectivity and truth which [sic] have functioned within the para-
digms of modernity to oppress women."'8 5
Postmodernism at its strongest is helpful for feminist legal theory
in that it aids an understanding of the underpinnings of law itself and
its claims of rationality, objectivity, and universality. However, with-
out the ability to distance oneself and gain some perspective, it be-
comes impossible to develop any overarching principles or underlying
80. Frug, supra note 55, at 1046-47.
81. Patricia Waugh, Postmodernism and Feminism, in CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST
THEORIES 177 (Stevi Jackson & Jackie Jones eds., 1998). See also Hunter et al., supra
note 37; Barbara Stark, After/word(s): 'Violations of Human Dignity' and Postmodern
International Law, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 315, 320 (2002) (stating that postmodern interna-
tional law "is both inevitable and inevitably transient.").
82. Waugh, supra note 81, at 178.
83. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GENEAOLOGY OF MORALS (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
1967).
84. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWL-
EDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
85. Waugh, supra note 81, at 186, 187 (referring in part to Donna Haraway, A
Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s, in
LINDA J. NICHOLSON, FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (1990)).
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values by which to structure a society. If postmodernism absolutely
precludes discrimination between points of view, between multiple po-
sitions and discourses, it becomes incapable, in its most radical form,
of serving as the basis for a politics or epistemology. s 6 As such, I posit
that it is helpful to take from radical postmodernism an understand-
ing of the operatives at play, and then to see how that plays out with
regard to the need for collective agency and responsibility. Toward
this end, it is helpful to examine postmodernism in a weaker form, one
that is reconstructive in nature and communitarian in bent. Under
this branch of postmodernism, "'understanding arises through the
practices, customs, traditions and textures of a particular culture and
we may arrive at a shared structure of values, a sense of personal sig-
nificance, and the possibility of belief in historical progress through
collective engagements which do not require foundations of truth or
value."'8
7
a. Reconstructive postmodernism breaks conceptual holds by
recognizing the importance of maintaining a contextualized
theory of knowledge or understanding, while sustaining a
commitment to regulative legal principles.
A reconstructive form of postmodernism, epitomized by the her-
meneutic theory of Martin Heidegger, s8 and, to some extent, Hans-
Georg Gadamer,8 9 recognizes that all knowledge is situated in partic-
ular cultures and traditions, but that through an understanding of
these operatives it is possible to arrive at a shared value structure.
Feminist, postmodern theorists assert that it is possible, and advisa-
ble, to maintain a contextualist theory of knowledge or understanding,
while sustaining a commitment to regulative legal principles: that
'"we need both a contextual sense of our perspective from the place in
the world where we find ourselves, but also the discipline of imagining
that world from outside but with ourselves inside it."'90 Under this
theory, regulative legal principles should be developed that incorpo-
rate context, the situated subject, and the mutual interdependence of
human beings in society.
86. See Waugh, supra note 81, at 188 (arguing against the viability of universal
rationality).
87. Id. at 188.
88. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (1962).
89. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Garrett Barden & John Cumming
eds., Sheed & Ward Ltd. trans., Seabury Press 1975) (1960).
90. See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF (1992) (noting the importance of
integrating legal principles with contextual particularities); see also Waugh, supra note
81, at 190 (emphasizing the essential context).
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This argument touches on what is a crucial issue for a feminist
reconceptualization of justice-specifically, the issue of contextualiza-
tion and particularization. Within a political, economic, and social en-
vironment in which women have suffered discrimination that is both
superficial and embedded, where women have suffered precisely at
the hands of their context, it is a very dangerous thing to argue for a
greater contextualization of laws in the interest of a more holistic and
inclusive form of justice. Whose context will be enshrined into law,
whose context will be considered in the weighing of evidence, and if it
is a context of discrimination, then where are we left? Decontextual-
ization is impossible. The more law attempts to decontextualize its
situated subjects, the more embedded and harmful contexts are en-
shrined into law. What postmodernism offers us here is this: what is
required is an understanding of the cultural and dependent operatives
at play, and a simultaneous detachment from that context-to stand
back, reflect, compare, analyze, and make decisions based on all the
knowledge and understanding the process has brought to bear. It is
simply impossible to remove context from law; therefore, the context
that must be integrated into the process must be an inclusive one, one
that takes into account the situated subject.
3. Communitarianism breaks conceptual holds by recognizing
human identity as being socially constituted, by emphasizing
interdependence and supporting the underlying values of
collective life.
Postmodernism is in part borne of, at least in the United States
and Britain, a period where central political power was held by right
wing governments that effectively centralized state control in the
name of individualism and decentralization-introducing, for exam-
ple, market-based economic policies and "community-based" criminal
justice policies, that concentrated power in state hands while espous-
ing principles of removing state control and reinvesting that control in
its citizens. 9 1 These governments used the rhetoric of community to
garner support for their polices, in "community policing," for example,
or "community care," while somehow losing sight of what the concept
of community actually was. As Lacey notes:
[Wihat gave the language of community such rhetorical force
in these areas, notwithstanding the ease with which it could
be exposed as disingenuous or as downright hypocritical win-
dow-dressing, was that it spoke to our fears at the same mo-
ment as it whispered to our fantasies. We-or perhaps parts
of us-like to think that we live in real, identity-fostering,
91. LACEY, supra note 17, at 131.
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caring communities, yet part of the postmodern experience is
precisely the fear-indeed the knowledge-that we do not. In
this context, the rhetoric of community assumes a particular
power in the hands of government and other purveyors of in-
fluential social discourses. 9 2
It is argued that concepts such as "community," therefore, exist in
the fantasies of their subjects, as 'the signifiers construct rather than
describe the entities to which they refer.' 9 3
Communitarianism, as a political theory, has emerged in part as
a responsive theory, a critique of liberal individualism.9 4 Feminist le-
gal theorist Nicola Lacey outlines three distinct positions typically es-
poused with regard to communitarianism in her article, Community in
Legal Theory.9 5 First, communitarians are typically social construc-
tionist in their viewpoints, both in relationship to values and issues of
identity.96 Social constructionism has consistently been found within
the development of feminist theories, for entrenched within the con-
cept of artifice is the possibility of subversion. The recognition, there-
fore, of human identity as being socially constituted brings with it the
possibility of a world where that identity is constructed differently.
Secondly, communitarians seek to develop values such as community,
solidarity, and reciprocity-values which support the underlying ten-
ets of collective life.97 In feminist theory, we can see these values
manifest in issues such as childcare and public safety. 98 Finally, com-
munitarians adopt an interpretist viewpoint, seeing the subject as sit-
uated within its context. These "embodied" aspects of human
subjectivity, as Lacey terms them, have been intrinsic to feminist le-
gal theories: While male bodies have been constructed as "normal,"
female bodies have been constructed in opposition to the standard, an
idea which has been enshrined in law.
While there exist these similarities between feminist legal theory
and communitarianism, it is vital to maintain perspective. One must
be careful, for example, not to allow the notion of community to be
considered incontrovertible and to go unexamined. Political critique
must always be built into any form of association, particularly where
those forms of association have historically subordinated or excluded
women. 99 Thus, it is important to keep in perspective the potential
conservatism of communitarian thought, and the importance of pro-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 133.
94. Id. at 129.
95. Id. at 125.
96. Id. at 129.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 138.
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viding an adequate account of conditions under which subjects gain
access to membership and how power structures within those commu-
nities are created and maintained.
4. Theories of care break conceptual holds by emphasizing the
importance of mutual interdependence, consideration of
relationships, responsibilities to society, and collective values in
the law.
Theories of care break down moral judgments into distinct catego-
ries, and argue that not only are there two distinct ways of approach-
ing moral problems, but that those ways often fall along the lines of
sex, and, furthermore, that one sex, and therefore one entire type of
approach to moral problems, has been excluded from research circles
and hence policy formulation. Theories of care, thus, enable us to re-
cast moral problems, as enshrined in theories of justice and legal re-
gimes, by incorporating values including the importance of mutual
interdependence, consideration of relationships to society, and collec-
tive values. 10 0
Feminist theories of care are perhaps most reknown in the work
of Carol Gilligan, a developmental psychologist who has contributed
much to feminist theory through her work on the issue of women's
"difference." Gilligan observed that Kohlberg's work on moral de-
velopment had been exclusively derived from male subjects, and
suggested, based on her own work, that Kohlberg had thus inade-
quately-and inaccurately-represented human moral develop-
ment.1 0 '
Gilligan's theories are based on her accounts of two subjects, Jake
and Amy, and their responses to the Heinz dilemma, which Kohlberg
developed to measure moral development. 10 2 In the Heinz dilemma,
Heinz has to decide whether to steal a drug that he cannot afford and
which is necessary to save his wife's life. Jake and Amy, who are both
eleven, are asked whether Heinz should steal the drug. Jake consid-
ers the problem to be '"sort of like a math problem with humans,"' sets
it up as an equation, and works out the solution. He recognized that
100. For a comprehensive examination of theories of care, both inside and outside
the work of Carol Gilligan, see JUSTICE AND CARE: ESSENTIAL READINGS IN FEMINIST
ETHICS (Virginia Held ed., 1995); and DIEMUT ELISABET BUBECK, CARE, GENDER, AND
JUSTICE (1995).
101. Jenny Morgan, Feminist Theory as Legal Theory, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 743, 746
(1988), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY I, supra note 2, at 33; DuBois et al., supra
note 12, at 40-41 (conversation with Carol Gilligan); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). See generally LAw-
RENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE
IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981).
102. DuBois et al., supra note 12, at 40-41 (conversation with Carol Gilligan).
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the issue is one between life and property, and concludes that Heinz
should steal the drug based on his conclusion that life is more impor-
tant than property.1 0 3
Amy, however, is "evasive and unsure."1 0 4 When asked whether
Heinz should steal the drug, Amy responds, "'Well, I don't think so. I
think there might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could
borrow the money or make a loan or something but he really shouldn't
steal the drug-but his wife shouldn't die, either.' °1 0 5 She considers
then not the conflict between life and property, but the effect of the
potential theft on Heinz and his wife: '"If he stole the drug, then he
might save his wife then, but if he did, he might have to go to jail, and
then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the
drug and it might not be good. So, they should really just talk it out
and find some other way to make the money."'1 0 6 While on Kohlberg's
scale of moral development Jake would receive higher scores than
Amy, Gilligan suggests that both responses are equally sophisticated,
just different, with Amy 'seeing not a math problem with humans but
a narrative of relationships that extends over time ... ,107
103. GILLIGAN, supra note 101, at 26. See also Morgan, supra note 101, at 747 (dis-
cussing Gilligan's research).
104. GILLIGAN, supra note 101, at 28. See also Morgan, supra note 101, at 747 (dis-
cussing Gilligan's research).
105. GILLIGAN, supra note 101, at 28.
106. Id.
107. Id. Interestingly, when Amy and Jake were interviewed again, at the age of 15,
Amy's response was different:
I hated these dilemmas last time as much as I do now... It all depends. What
if the husband got caught? It would not help his wife. And anyway, from eve-
rything I know about cancer, it cannot be cured by a single treatment. And,
where would this drug be, sitting out on the shelf of a drugstore? The whole
situation is unreal.
Id. And, after a pause, "like I said last time," (when she actually had not), "life comes
before property. She should steal the drug." Gilligan concluded as follows:
That, by the way, is the "right" answer. She jumps a full stage in moral devel-
opment, as measured by Kohlberg's scale - from eleven to fifteen years. But
look what she has done now: She is learning that if she enters into a construc-
tion of reality which she has identified as unreal and problematic, she will ad-
vance in "moral development." In other words, if you equate moral
development with justice reasoning, then, in a sense you render her more
deeply uncertain, more susceptible to the tension between what she thinks and
what she really thinks, less convinced that her voice will be heard.
Id. at 129.
Jake's response at 15 was that "money comes and goes, but human life only comes
once, so therefore the wife's claim to her life takes precedence over the druggist's claim
to his property." When asked to comment on the fact that the druggist may feel strongly
about his profit, Jake responds that the druggist has "the wrong set of priorities." Jake
starts to consider the feelings that would be involved on both sides and says, "I think
that what the druggist is going to experience is some sorrow and some anger over losing
his money, and it is a shame that he has to feel that." But, on the whole, and applying
the same template of evaluation, Jake concludes that "it is not as deplorable a thing as
the idea of Heinz - with his wife dying and him having to deal with his wife's dying."
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Based on a body of research of which Jake and Amy are one part,
Gilligan asserts that it is possible to differentiate two distinct voices in
the way people define moral problems. She defines these voices as
justice reasoning1 0 8 and care reasoning. One voice speaks of values
such as equality, fairness, rights, and reciprocity; the other talks of
connection, care, response and not hurting others. Gilligan posits that
one can see the presence of these two voices in the construction, reso-
lution, and evaluation of moral problems. The two voices are aware of
each other's presence, and most people, in fact-both men and wo-
men-represent both voices to some extent in defining moral
problems. The striking finding, however, was the strong tendency of
individuals to focus on one voice or the other, a tendency that holds
true across gender lines. While the inclusion of both voices into moral
discourse, into conflict resolution, and in decision-making transforms
the very discourse itself,1 0 9 the traditional legal systems we have set
up to support the foundations of society do not easily accommodate
both voices which are, although at times coexistent, often in opposi-
tion to each other. 110 The adversarial system emphasizes certainty,
which inevitably results in eliminating one perspective or the other. If
a psychological analysis of how people view moral problems consists of
a sample exclusively comprised of men, then given Gilligan's findings
indicating that there is an overwhelming tendency in men to focus on
justice and only minimally on care,1 1 1 the voice of care will be
smothered by its opposition. 11 2 If theorists, like Kohlberg, base con-
clusions on all male samples, then the inclusion of women at all in the
application of that research is '"problematic because it challenges the
very definition of the problem:"' 1 13
On Kohlberg's scale, Jake has not matured in his moral development, because his jus-
tice reasoning has stayed the same. Thus, Gilligan concludes, "these interpretive
schemes encourage Amy to become more deeply uncertain and Jake to become more
simply dogmatic- to take the position that anyone who does not agree with him has 'the
wrong set of priorities.'" Id.; DuBois et aL, supra note 12, at 41 (conversation with Carol
Gilligan).
108. Although I base much research on Carol Gilligan's research on the moral con-
ceptualizations of men and women as she has defined them, in the "ethic of care" and
the "ethic of justice," it is essential for my analysis to keep those categorizations as
terms of art for referential purposes, and not to allow "justice" itself to be defined in this
manner.
109. DuBois et al., supra note 12, at 42 (conversation with Carol Gilligan).
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id.
112. Id. Gilligan recalls: In a sense you can now hear through these findings the
empirical basis for such statements of psychologists as Freud's observations that women
have less sense of justice than men and that women have less tendency to focus on
justice issues in resolving moral problems or Piaget's observation that girls are less




You have this group that focuses on care and cannot be ac-
counted for by a theory that equates morality with justice
reasoning. The question shifts by virtue of the observation
that both men and women in fact represent both justice and
care considerations in defining moral problems. The question
shifts from, "'Why are women confusing morality with care or
interpersonal relationships?'" to, "'Why are men not
representing in their formal decisions-making procedures
what in fact is present in their thinking-the realization that
there is another dimension to moral problems, a dimension
which has to do with issues of care, responsibility, and
interdependence?" 1 14
Gilligan's research demonstrates the presence of a distinct moral
voice, a voice largely attributed to women and ignored in the historical
development not only of psychological theory but legal theory and
structure. This voice is one that emphasizes interdependence, respon-
sibility, and care for others. It involves cultivating desirable forms of
emotion rather than exerting control over, and detachment from,
those emotions. This voice must be heard in a legal regime that pur-
ports to provide a system for moral decision-making and justice "for
all."
E. A FEMINIST THEORY OF JUSTICE - A SuMMAYt
In the first section of Part II, I introduced the need for feminist
legal theory that reconceptualizes justice-in both its righteousness
and its implementation of that right-by viewing its ideological and
institutional operatives. In the first of a three step process to do just
that, I discussed historical developments in feminist legal theory, in
an effort to provide perspective on legal reform in so far as that per-
spective enables one to see both continuities and change over time. In
the next section, I explored assumptions the law makes about its legal
subjects, specifically, methods in which the law continues to be "sexed"
in both substance and form, particularly criminal law governing sex-
ual violence against women. In the third step, I provided an analysis
of various theories having a direct application to a feminist reconcep-
tualization of justice. These theories, including (but certainly not lim-
ited to) deconstruction, postmodernism, communitarianism, and the
ethic of care, enable us to break the conceptual holds of justice and its
current manifestations, and to examine its underpinnings-to recog-
nize that it is impossible (and inadvisable) to extract context from jus-
tice, and that attempts to do so merely end up being un"just," by
enshrining into law contexts that operate beneath the surface-con-
114. Id. at 48-49.
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texts that codify discrimination, that aspire to rationality and objec-
tivity while codifying a very particularized form of rationality, defined
historically by those with economic, social, and political power.
Rather, we learn that values are codified in concepts of justice at
all levels, institutional, ideological, and organizational, and that, as
such, laws must reflect values that are inclusive and holistic, not
merely representative of one political perspective over time. From his-
tory, from theory, from a thorough explication of legal structure and
form, we learn that it is vital to acknowledge existent inequalities;
that equality of opportunity may be precluded by inequality of condi-
tion. We learn that law can benefit from emphasizing the mutual in-
terdependence of its subjects, rather than those subjects' autonomy or
independence. We learn that it is valuable to take into consideration
responsibilities to society, and future generations, in the interest of
connectivity and the intersubjectivity of human beings. And finally,
we learn that justice must take into account context, most particu-
larly, a context that dismantles inequalities and power structures
rather than enshrines them.
III. APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO VICTIMS OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT RWANDA
In Part III of this Article, I apply these five principles to the situa-
tion of women survivors of sexual violence in post-conflict Rwanda in
an effort to inform the empowerment of women and construction and
administration of justice. This effort is a three-step process. First, I
discuss a brief history of the genocide in Rwanda, particularly events
relative to the commission of systematic sexual violence during the
genocide. Secondly, I provide a somewhat abbreviated discussion of
the development of crimes of sexual violence in the context of interna-
tional law. While an extensive discussion of the history of the
Rwandan genocide and/or the development of crimes of sexual vio-
lence in international law is outside the scope of this Article, a brief
contextual discussion is necessary to inform the analysis. The bulk of
the analysis is contained within the third section. Therein, I apply the
principles discussed above to particular legal operatives in post-con-
flict Rwanda in an effort to critique their potential for empowering
victims of sexual violence.
A. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
The political, economic, and social forces leading up to the geno-
cide in Rwanda are complex and, in large part, beyond the scope of
this endeavour. In the following section, I seek rather to provide a
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general history of events, as those events set the stage for crimes of
sexual violence committed during the genocide.
The genocide that occurred over the course of approximately one
hundred days in Rwanda was the culmination of approximately one
hundred years of conflict-conflict that was largely socially con-
structed by parties both inside and outside Rwanda. 1 15 Over this pe-
riod of time, Rwandans were socially constructed as consisting of
distinct races and ethnicities, despite the fact that many scholars-
and many Rwandans-do not see ethnic differences, let alone racial
ones.
1 16
There are three basic groups that comprise the social fabric of
Rwanda: the Hutus; the Tutsis; and the Twas.11 7 The Hutus have
historically comprised approximately eighty-five percent of the popu-
lation of Rwanda. However, this majority position has not translated
into political and/or economic control. The Tutsis, who have enjoyed
positions of economic and political power, have consistently had four-
teen percent of the population of Rwanda. 11s After entering Rwanda
in the fifteenth century, the Tutsis quickly rose to aristocracy, estab-
lishing a monarchy and feudal system over the already present Hutus
115. For a thorough explication of the history of the genocide in Rwanda, see ALISON
LIEBHAFsKY DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
(1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/; PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE
WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STO-
RIES FROM RWANDA (1998); and GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, HISTORY OF A
GENOCIDE (1995). Figures vary on the exact number of people killed. See, e.g., DES
FORGES, supra ("Serious authorities differ by hundreds of thousands of deaths - a quite
remarkable variation. The highest persuasive figure for Tutsi killed seems to be
800,000, the very lowest, 500,000."); Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive
Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355, 361 n.16
(2002) (stating "the number of Hutu who were killed is probably between 200,000 and
300,000."); see generally PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE,
ITS COURTS, AND THE U.N. CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (2000) (noting the disparity of
information).
116. Ian F. Haney Lopez has defined race in the following way: "Race is neither an
essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing, plastic
process subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects
of daily decisions." Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 163, 165 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
2000); Adrien Katherine Wing & Mark Richard Johnson, The Promise of a Post-Geno-
cide Constitution: Healing Rwandan Spirit Injuries, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 249-50
(2002).
117. There is some differentiation among scholars as to whether the plural of
"Hutu," "Tutsi," and "Twa" contains an "s." Many times, "Twa" is not pluralized with an
"s," although the practice varies. For consistency's sake, I have elected here to include
the "s" for all three groups.
118. Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation
in Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49, 60-62 (1995); Wing et al., supra note
116, at 253-54.
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and engaging them in a form of serfdom by which the Hutus entered
into contracts, called ubuhake, with the Tutsis. 11 9
While the Tutsis maintained an aristocratic rule, there were per-
meable lines between groups and the Hutus and Tutsis shared a great
deal. 120 Intermarriage was common, and the groups shared a single
language and a common culture. 12 1 They subscribe to the same relig-
ious practices, have similar tastes in food, music, and art, and use per-
sonal names interchangeably. 12 2 Perceived physical differences
became more apparent than real.12 3
The Tutsis were preferred by Belgian colonizers and rose in supe-
riority at the expense of the Hutus, as the colonizers placed great em-
phasis on perceived ethnic differences between the two groups. The
Belgians implemented a programme under which an individual's eth-
nic group was to be specified on identity cards, and, in the census of
1933-34, constructed the Tutsis as "nonindigenous" and the Hutus as
"indigenous," establishing a legal difference between the two
groups.124 During the push for decolonization, loyalties changed as
the Hutu majority supported Belgian decolonization efforts. 12 5
Post-independence politics in Rwanda were largely characterized
by ethnicity as Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries. 12 6 Many
6migr~s concentrated in Uganda, where they formed a number of po-
119. Maguire, supra note 118, at 60-62; Wing et al., supra note 116, at 253-54.
Under the terms of ubuhake, the Hutus promised services in exchange for the use of
cattle and land. According to Phillip Gourevitch, this was the original inequality: "cat-
tle are a more valuable asset than produce, and.. .the word Tutsi became synonymous
with a political and economic elite." GOuREVITCH, supra note 115, at 48.
120. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999). Despite a distinct lack of historical records and oral tradi-
tion, the records that do exist are virtually absent of a pre-colonial history of hatred or
violence; the relationship between the groups was hierarchical but relatively
harmonious.
121. Wing et al., supra note 116, at 254.
122. Id.
123. Tutsis were perceived as being taller, with thinner noses, and Hutus were
thought to be shorter, stockier, and with wide, short noses. GOUREVITCH, supra note
115, at 57.
124. Id. at 57; Wing et al., supra note 116, at 258; MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VIC-
TIMS BECOME KILLERS 100 (2001).
125. See Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Background Note:
Rwanda, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/2861.htm (last visited at Apr. 28, 2008); see also
MAMDANI, supra note 124, at 114-24. In 1959, a Mwami (chief) died without an heir,
and his half-brother succeeded to the throne without colonial consultation. Id. This act
set off a round of violence between the Tutsi political party, the Union Nationale
Rwandaise, and the Hutu party, PARMEHUTU. Id. Belgium declared a state of emer-
gency and began replacing Tutsi Mwamis with Hutus, presumably because the Hutus
were in support of Belgian democratic reform efforts, an act which sharply heightened
already grave tensions. Id. Rwanda finally obtained independence at the hands of the
General Assembly when it ended the trusteeship of Belgium in 1962. Id.
126. Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in
Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 545, 557 (1998).
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litical and military groups that eventually merged into the Rwandan
Patriotic Front ("RPF").127 After Hutu Major-General Juvenal Haby-
arimana ascended to power, Tutsis continued to experience increasing
social and political discrimination, 128 which heightened tensions,
eventually resulting in negotiations between the Habyarimana regime
and opposition forces and the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993.
While the regime put on a front of peace and reconciliation, it was
preparing for genocide behind the scenes. 129
The government created Interahamwe ("those who attack to-
gether") and Impuzamugambi ("those who have the same goal") as ci-
vilian militia, and Hutus were encouraged to launch a preemptive
massacre to save themselves. 130 As part of this effort, Hutus were
encouraged to satisfy their umuganda, a day of unpaid labour given
once a month for community service projects, by slaughtering Tut-
sis.131 Slaughtering as a civic duty began in 1991 and 1992.132
Within this political framework, bright lines were drawn onto the
canvas of history while the reality of the actual individuals involved
was shaded into the background. Much of the Hutu opposition did not
oppose Habyarimana's regime and its anti-Tutsi positions, and many
of the Tutsis who lived in Rwanda did not support the RPF.13 3 The
RPF was comprised mostly of children of the 1960s 6migr6s who had
been raised in Uganda, and distinct from the Tutsi population of
Rwanda.13 4 Despite the RPF's lack of connection with the local Tutsi
population, it was the local Tutsi population who suffered as innocent
127. United States Institute of Peace, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and
Genocide (Jan. 1995), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwandal.html
[hereinafter USIP Special Report]. The RPF became integrated within the Ugandan
state and contained an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 Tutsi refugees by 1990. Drumbl,
supra note 126, at 557.
128. Drumbl, supra note 126. For example, by law, Tutsi participation in the com-
munity was proportional to the group's percentage of the population, although the
figures used by the government were not quite reflective of the demographic reality. Id.
For example, the government pursued an affirmative action policy whereby, despite the
fact that the Tutsis comprised fourteen percent of the population, they were said to
comprise nine percent of the population and were therefore only entitled to nine percent
of employment and education positions. Id.
129. Id. at 559. During this time, Habyarimana's propaganda machine went into
action. Id. The government staged an attack on Kigali, blaming the attack on the RPF
and inspiring fear of the RPF in the majority population. Id. The regime claimed that
in rural villages Tutsi "devils" lurked in the bushes. Id. The radio service began to be
used as a tool to fuel hatred and fear of the Tutsis. Id. The Habyarimana regime also
received assistance from the international community. Id. France sent troops who
helped the Rwandan government fend off an RPF attack in 1990, and France, Egypt,
and South Africa all continued to send troops even after the Tutsi pogroms began. Id.
130. Wing et al., supra note 116, at 270.
131. Drumbl, supra note 126, at 558.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 558-62.
134. Id.
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victims of Habyarimana's reprisals when the RPF staged its
intervention. 135
The framework of Rwandan society, sitting as it was on a slag
heap of socially constructed ethnicities and politically motivated fear,
collapsed into disaster when President Habyarimana was killed in a
plane crash on April 6, 1994.136 Hutu extremists within Haby-
arimana's party immediately assumed power, set up roadblocks, and
implemented a policy of political realignment through mass murder.
Genocide raged in Rwanda for fifteen weeks from April to July.
137
During this time, up to three-quarters of the Tutsi population of
Rwanda was murdered and the country's infrastructure practically
destroyed.13
s
1. Propaganda was instrumental in encouraging sexual violence
against Tutsi women in so far as it was used extensively to incite
hatred of Tutsi women and fear of their sexuality.
Propaganda was crucial in setting the stage for crimes of sexual
violence committed against Tutsi women. 13 9 Propaganda character-
ized Tutsi women as enemy infiltrators; intermarrying was strongly
discouraged, and Hutu women were exalted as being superior to Tutsi
135. Id. (citing GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 156
(1995)) (stating who "underscores the comments of an elderly Tutsi man to an RPF
guerrilla entering his village: 'You want power? You will get it. But here we will all die.
Is it worth it to you?'"). Id. at 561.
136. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PLAYING THE "CoMMUNAL CARD:" COMMUNAL VIO-
LENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1995) (discussing the crash that killed President Haby-
arimana); PRUNIER, supra note 135 (providing a thorough discussion of the events).
There is speculation that the plane may have been shot down by Habyarimana's own
soldiers. Id.
137. Annonciata Mukanyonga, a survivor of the genocide whose children were killed
in the violence, commented: "Looking out on the hills you could think they were just
cutting banana trees. When you cut a banana tree you feel no pity. They piled up the
bodies by the roadsides. The more they killed the bigger the reward." GACACA: LIVING
TOGETHER AGAIN IN RWANDA? (Dominant 7/Gacaca Productions 2002) [hereinafter
GACACA].
138. Ironically, the ratio of Hutu to Tutsi remains approximately the same. When
Tutsi leaders regained power at the end of the genocide in July 1994, hundreds of
thousands of Tutsi refugees who had been living outside the country returned, replen-
ishing the Tutsi population. See generally ALISON LIEBHAFSKY DES FORGES, LEAVE
NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999), available at http://www.hrw.
org/reports/1999/rwandal (providing an account of the Tutsi's return). The Twas, which
have historically comprised approximately one percent of Rwanda's population, are con-
sidered to be descendants of Rwanda's first inhabitants, which were pygmy-like forest
dwellers. Maguire, supra note 118, at 60-62; Wing et al., supra note 116, at 253-54.
139. See generally William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Geno-
cide, 46 McGILL L.J. 141 (2000) (noting the influence of propaganda on the incitement
to genocide).
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women. 140 One of the primary tools for Hutu extremist propaganda
was the magazine Kangura, which benefited from extensive govern-
ment support.141 Kangura billed itself as '"the voice that seeks to
awake and guide the majority people."1 4 2 Among its anti-Tutsi
messages, Kangura published the Hutu Ten Commandments, which
prohibited Hutus from forming various types of social, commercial,
and legal relationships with Tutsis. Extraordinarily, the first three
commandments related to Tutsi women:
1. Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wher-
ever she is, works for the interest of the Tutsi ethnic
group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Muhutu
who: marries a Tutsi woman; befriends a Tutsi woman;
[and/or] employs a Tutsi woman as secretary or
comcubine.
2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are
more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman,
wife, and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful,
good secretaries and more honest?
3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your hus-
bands, brothers, and sons back to reason.' 43
Kangura also published many articles and cartoons that focused
on Tutsi women, with particular emphasis on their sexuality. One ar-
ticle was entitled, for example, "A Cockroach Cannot Give Birth to a
Butterfly."1 44 Propaganda portrayed Tutsi women as more beautiful
and desirable, as sexual objects who used their charms to seduce
140. Llezlie L. Green, Gender Hate Propaganda and Sexual Violence in the
Rwandan Genocide: An Argument for Intersectionality in International Law, 33 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 733, 733-55 (2002). In Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 732 (Sept. 2, 1998), the Tribunal found:
As part of the propaganda campaign geared to mobilizing the Hutu against the
Tutsi, the Tutsi women were presented as sexual objects. . . [B]efore being
raped and killed, Alexia, who was the wife of the Professor, Ntereye, and her
two nieces, were forced by the Interahamwe to undress and ordered to run and
do exercises "in order to display the thighs of Tutsi women." The Interahamwe
who raped Alexia said, as he threw her on the ground and got on top of her "let
us now see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman tastes like".. . Akayesu himself,
speaking to the Interahamwe who were committing the rapes, said to them:
"don't ever ask again what a Tutsi woman tastes like."
141. Green, supra note 140 (commenting on the active support from the Rwandan
government for Kangura). Forty-two new journals were created in 1991 in Rwanda,
eleven of which were linked to the Habyarimana government. Id.
142. Id.; Schabas, supra note 139, at 145 (stating that Kangura "enjoyed enormous
influence within the country.").
143. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences: Report of the Mission to Rwanda on the Issues of Violence against Wo-
men in Situations of Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Violence against Women].
144. Tutsis were referred to as "cockroaches" in the propaganda. Because ethnicity
was determined along patrilineal lines, the offspring of Tutsi women and Hutu men
were technically Hutu. Green, supra note 140, at 742, 746.
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members of the Western presence stationed in Rwanda. 14 5 One infa-
mous cartoon depicted Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, head of the
UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, in an embrace with a Tutsi woman
who was nearly naked. 14 6 The caption read: "'General Dallaire and
his army have fallen into the trap of fatal women." 1 4 7 The propa-
ganda had a clear effect on the perpetrators of sexual violence during
the genocide. Survivors have stated that during the assaults, their
violators made statements such as: "You Tutsi women think that you
are too good for us," and "We want to see how sweet Tutsi women
are."'148
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN ARMED
CONFLICT HAS A PIECEMEAL HISTORY AND HAS ONLY RECENTLY
BEGUN TO BE RECOGNIZED AS A CRIME IN ITS OWN RIGHT.
Inextricable from the history of organized conflict is a history of
sexual violence against women. 149 Sexual violence includes many dif-
ferent crimes, such as rape, sexual mutilation, forced prostitution, and
forced pregnancy. Considered to be an inevitable product of war
rather than a weapon of war, sexual violence has been historically
downplayed in the international legal community;150 both its status
as a crime and its effects on victimized populations have been largely
ignored within formal legal frameworks. 15 1 It was not until the early
1990s, in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, that the
145. Id. at 748.
146. Id.
147. Id. Radio was by far the most influential and pervasive media for information
and propaganda. See generally LINDA KIRSCHKE, BROADCASTING GENOCIDE: CENSOR-
SHIP, PROPAGANDA AND STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN RWANDA 1990-1994 (1996). Radio
Television Libre des Mille Collines, founded in large part by Hutu extremists, worked
with Radio Rwanda-the official voice of the government-to spread anti-Tutsi
messages. Id. Broadcasts warned the Tutsi people: "You cockroaches must know you
are made of flesh! We won't let you kill! We will kill you!" Id.
148. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LrvEs: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH 18 (1996), available at httpJ//www.hrw.org/re-
ports/1996/Rwanda.htm [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LrvEs]; Green,
supra note 140, at 749.
149. See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
347 (1975) (analyzing the history of rape in the context of war). While sexual violence in
conflict situations affects men as well as women, men are targeted as victims for differ-
ent reasons and affected in distinct ways. As such, this analysis focuses specifically on
violence toward women.
150. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1993) (discussing the history of wartime rape as a hierarchical
assertion of male dominance over female subjectivity). See also BROWNMILLER, supra
note 149 (providing an analysis of rape in the context of war).
151. Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual
Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1997); Judith Gardam, Women and
the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence?, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1997). But see
Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J.
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international legal community finally acknowledged that sexual vio-
lence against women in the context of armed conflict violates funda-
mental principles of human rights and humanitarian law.152
Sexual violence during armed conflicts can have a variety of un-
derlying causes. One commonly discussed factor has been intertwined
with the view of women as property-that women are part of the
"spoils" of war to which victors are entitled. 153 Another reason for
sexual violence against women is the satisfaction and placation of
troops, such as occurred when "comfort women" were forced into mili-
tary sexual slavery by the Japanese Army in World War 11.154 An-
other way that sexual violence toward women is used in armed conflict
is to destroy male, and hence community, pride. 15 5 If women are
raped, their husbands, fathers, and brothers are emasculated, and the
community is broken. 156 Sexual violence may also be used as a pun-
ishment for women who are perceived as having a certain amount of
power, as an instrument of terror, and as a genocidal strategy.15 7
Victims of sexual violence suffer physical and psychological ef-
fects, which can be heightened within the context of war, when many
victims suffer from other abuse, such as the loss of family, displace-
ment, and/or loss of possessions. 158 The social stigma attached to rape
can have severe effects on its victims, who may bear children from the
rape or be considered by the community to be "unmarriageable" after-
INT'L L. 424 (1993) (arguing that rape has been prohibited in wartime for centuries and
discussing the conviction of individual soldiers in domestic courts for isolated acts).
152. See Women2000, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Re-
sponse 2 (Apr. 1998), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/w2apr98.htm [herein-
after Women2000] (taking a stand against sexual violence in armed conflict and noting
its prevalence); U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 110(c), U.N. Doc. A/51/557 (Oct.
25, 1996) (addressing sexual violence in armed conflict); MacKinnon, supra note 150
(discussing rape in the context of war).
153. Tamara L. Tompkins, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Un-
speakable, 70:4 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 845, 848, 851 (1995) (noting General Patton's sug-
gestion that rape is "an inevitable byproduct of war."); Id. at 848 (remarking that
General Andrew Jackson originally coined the phrase "booty and beauty" in the War of
1812, to make clear what kind of spoils ... to the victor go.").
154. See, e.g., Interview with Radhika Coomaraswamy, United Nation's Special
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, in Libertas, International Centre for Human
Rights and Democratic Development 7 (Dec. 1997) (I don't think I have ever heard such
horrendous tales."); Christine M. Chinkin, Women's International Tribunal on Japanese
Military Sexual Slavery, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 335 (2001) (discussing justice and Japanese
'comfort women" during World War II).
155. See Women2000, supra note 152; BROWNMILLER, supra note 149; Adrien Kathe-
rine Wing, Critical Race Feminism and the International Human Rights of Women in
Bosnia, Palestine, and South Africa: Issues for LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 337, 343-44 (1996-97).
156. Women2000, supra note 152.
157. Id.
158. Id.; Tompkins, supra note 153, at 856-59. See also infra Part III.C.2, 3.
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ward.159 Permanent physical damage, including damage to the repro-
ductive system, often results. 160
Despite receiving evidence of rape in World War II, neither the
charters of the Nuremberg nor the Tokyo tribunals made reference to
sexual violence. 161 While rape was explicitly listed as a crime under
Control Council Law No. 10 when additional war crimes trials were
held, no rape charges were actually brought under that law. 162 De-
cades later, the legal silence about sexual violence in armed conflicts
remained. The Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children
in Armed Conflict, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974,
failed to make explicit reference to sexual violence in armed con-
flict, 16 3 as did the Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of
Women, adopted in 1985 to provide a blueprint for women's issues to
the year 2000.164 A UN report following the invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq in 1990 documented the prevalence of sexual violence committed
by Iraqi soldiers against Kuwaiti women. 165 While UN resolutions
omitted explicit reference to sexual violence, the Compensation Com-
mission developed to compensate victims who suffered damage as a
result of the invasion expressly included compensation within its ju-
159. Tompkins, supra note 153, at 856-59. See also infra Part III.C.3.
160. Id. See also infra Part III.C.2.
161. See, e.g., TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MIL-
ITARY TRIBUNAL 404-07 (1946) (failing to address crimes of sexual violence); JUDGMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 1012 (1948) (failing to
address crimes of sexual violence); INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR
EAST, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 4467-68 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia M. Zaide
eds., 1981) (failing to address crimes of sexual violence).
162. 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, art. II(1)(c) at XVII (1950) (giving jurisdiction
over 'Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.'). Id.
163. U.N. Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and
Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX), at 146, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31 (Dec. 14,
1974); This omission is particularly glaring in light of preceding evidence that rape had
been committed on a massive scale three years previously in the armed conflict in Ban-
gladesh. Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteum on Violence Against Wo-
men, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov. 22, 1994). See also
Women2000, supra note 152, at 4 (discussing incidents of rape in this context).
164. World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Na-
tions Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, July 15-26, 1985, Nairobi
Forward-looking Stratagies for the Advancement of Women, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/
Rev.1 (July 26, 1985). The document did, however, reference the vulnerability of women
to sexual abuse generally.
165. Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteum of the Commission on
Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation,
delivered to the U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26 (1992) (prepared
by Walter Kalin).
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risdiction for physical or mental injury resulting from sexual
assault.166
It was in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, how-
ever, that the issue of sexual violence came into focus as a serious
crime in the international community. 16 7 In 1992, Security Council
Resolution 798 referenced the "'massive, organized and systematic de-
tention and rape of women"' in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 168 The Spe-
cial Rapporteur sent a team of medical experts to investigate rape in
1993,169 while also in that year the Security Council created the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 ("ICTY"), whose man-
date envisaged the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence committed
during the conflict. 170 The first testimony at the international level
from women regarding rape in armed conflict was given in the
Tadic1 71 case, the first prosecution brought before the ICTY. 17 2 The
conflict in the former Yugoslavia was a watershed event regarding in-
ternational recognition and awareness of crimes of sexual violence in
armed conflict. 173
166. Women2000, supra note 152, at 7. See also U.N. Security Council, Compensa-
tion Commission, Personal Injury and Mental Pain and Anguish, 13, U.N. Doc. S/24589
(Sep. 28, 1992); The Panel of Commissioners, Report and Recommendations made by the
Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the Second Installment of Claims for
Serious Personal Injury or Death, 10, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/4 (Dec. 15, 1994).
167. See generally Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia,
delivered to the U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411993/50 (Feb. 10, 1993)
(delivered by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki).
168. S.C. Res. 798, U.N. Doc. S/RES/798 (Dec. 18, 1992).
169. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992). See also Security General,
Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. (Feb. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Security General, Interim
Report]; Secretary General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pur-
suant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. s/19941674 (May 27, 1994).
170. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
171. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Indictment (Feb. 13, 1995), amended,
Case No. IT-94-1-I (Sept. 1, 1995), amended, Case No. IT-94-1-I (Dec. 14, 1995).
172. The initial indictment charged Tadic with rape of a female prisoner at the
Omarska camp. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I (crimes of sexual violence were included dif-
ferently or added with each amendment of the indictment). While the charge was with-
drawn pre-trial, evidence of rape was still provided as general evidence against the
defendant. Id.
173. Around this time, the issue began receiving a significant amount of attention
within the U.N. system. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25,
1993, The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action Adopted by the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157/24 (Oct. 13, 1993) (recognizing that vio-
lence against women is a human rights issue); Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence against Women, G.A. Res 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994) (rec-
ognizing that women in conflict situations are particularly vulnerable to violence); U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
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Despite the raised consciousness of the international community
regarding these issues, the application of that consciousness to the
conflict in Rwanda was slow to come about. During the genocide, re-
ports detailed crimes of sexual violence that were stunning in both
prevalence and gravity, including rape, mutilation, forced slavery, and
myriad sexual torture.174 However, neither the Security Council nor
the preliminary report of its Commission of Experts, which was given
the mandate to investigate violations of international humanitarian
law during the genocide, referred to sexual violence. 175 It was only
when NGOs put pressure on the UN that the Commission began to
include rape as part of its investigations. 176 Sexual violence received
an increasing amount of attention in UN investigations, such that the
Special Rapporteur for Rwanda concluded in a 1996 report that
"'[r]ape was systematic and was used as a "weapon" by the perpetra-
tors of the massacres . . . rape was the rule and its absence was the
exception."1 7 7
Of Minorities, Preparatory Document on the Question of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slav-
ery and Slavery-Like Practices During Wartime, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/44 (Sept.
7, 1993) (submitted by Linda Chavez). In 1995, women and armed conflict was listed as
one of the twelve areas of concern at the Fourth World Conference on Women held in
Beijing:
Para. 135. While entire communities suffer the consequences of armed conflict
and terrorism, women and girls are particularly affected because of their status
in society and their sex. Parties to the conflict often rape women with impunity
sometimes using systematic rape as a tactic of war and terrorism. The impact
of violence against women and violations of the human rights of women in such
situations is experienced by women of all ages, who suffer displacement, loss of
home and property, loss or involuntary disappearance of close relatives, pov-
erty and family separation and disintegration, and who are victims of acts of
murder, terrorism, torture, involuntary disappearance, sexual slavery, rape,
sexual abuse and forced pregnancy in situations of armed conflict, especially as
a result of policies of ethnic cleansing and other new and emerging forms of
violence. This is compounded by the life-long social, economic and psychologi-
cally traumatic consequences of armed conflict and foreign occupation and
alien domination.
The Fourth World Conference on Women, September 4-15, 1995, 135, U.N. Doc. Al
CONf.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995).
174. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVEs, supra note 148.
175. See Security General, Preliminary Report of the Commission of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (Oct. 4, 1994).
176. Women2000, supra note 152, at 7 ("The NGO community was ultimately re-
sponsible for insisting that the international community place the issue on its agenda.").
See also Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 935, I9136-37, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9, 1994) (referencing
information submitted by the NGO African Rights).
177. Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, f/16, delivered to Econ.
and Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 (Jan. 29, 1996) (submitted by Mr. Reno
Degni-Sgui).
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The Minister of Gender and Women's Development in Rwanda es-
timates that 250,000 women were raped during the genocide.
17 8
Other estimates put the figure much higher.'7 9 A 1999 study by a
survivors' group found that 80.9% of survivors of sexual and gender
violence showed symptoms of trauma, 69% are HIV positive, 13% had
broken vertebrae, 12% had lost leg usage, and 7.9% had their legs
amputated. 180
In 1994, the UN created an ad hoc tribunal, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the "ICTR," or the "Tribunal"), to in-
vestigate and prosecute crimes arising out of the Rwandan geno-
cide. 18 1 In the first few years of its existence, however, little attempt
was made to prosecute crimes of sexual violence, despite the fact that
the ICTR Statute, like that of the ICTY, lists rape as a crime against
humanity. 18 2 In fact, the ICTR Statute also expressly refers to crimes
such as "'rape, enforced prostitution, and sexual assault'" as being vio-
lations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, discussed be-
low. 183 Despite the legal framework put in place, no charges on
grounds of sexual violence were included in an indictment until
1997.184
C. THE PRINCIPLES OF A FEMINIST THEORY OF JUSTICE IDENTIFIED IN
PART II CAN BE APPLIED IN RWANDA TO EMPOWER WOMEN VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE.
This section will apply the following principles to particular is-
sues in post-conflict Rwanda in an effort to illustrate their potential
for empowering victims of sexual violence: (1) an emphasis on context
while sustaining a commitment to regulative legal principles; (2) the
acknowledgment of existent inequalities; (3) consideration of un-
178. Rwanda Launches Anti-Sexual Violence Programme, Latest News from
Rwanda, httpJ/www.gov.rw/government/060802.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2008) [here-
inafter Rwanda Launches].
179. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LrvEs, supra note 148, at 34.
180. Rwanda Launches, supra note 178 (Avega-Aghozo is a survivors' group in
Rwanda.)
181. S.C.Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), available at http://wwwl.
umn.edulhumanrts/peace/docs/scres955.html [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
182. Id.
183. Id. (The ICTR Statute explicitly lists sexual violence as a crime, authorizing
jurisdiction over crimes included in Articles 2-4, specifically, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Addi-
tional Protocol II. Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute grant authority to try defendants
for individual criminal responsibility on the basis of both individual culpability and su-
perior authority.).
184. See Akayesu Indictment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (including rape in the indict-
ment after repeated testimony before the court).
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chosen relationships; (4) an emphasis on mutual interdependence; and
(5) the recognition of collective values and societal responsibilities.
1. Women victims of sexual violence in Rwanda will be empowered
by legal operatives that maintain a strong contextualized
understanding while sustaining a commitment to regulative legal
principles.
In the following section, I apply this principle to three distinct is-
sues in post-conflict Rwanda. The first issue is that of legal regimes
that overlap both in jurisdiction and substance. The second issue is
the trial of crimes of sexual violence under the gacaca tribunals. The
third is the use of context in the Akayesu judgment.
a. Legal protections for victims of sexual violence in post-conflict
Rwanda exist at multiple levels and overlap in both form and
substance, creating a tension that may compromise the
commitment to regulative legal principles.
Sexual violence is a crime under both international law and the
domestic law of Rwanda, and there are three potential fora within
which these crimes may be prosecuted. Under international law, sex-
ual violence may in certain circumstances constitute a war crime,1 8 5
185. Sexual violence falls under the ambit of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which prohibits 'violence to life and person, in particular ... mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture' and 'outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humili-
ating and degrading treatment'. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts art. 4, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. Common Arti-
cle 3 is considered to be customary international law and thus applies to both interna-
tional and internal conflicts. Id. Article 4(2)(e) of Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions, also applying to the protection of citizens in internal armed conflicts, pro-
hibits 'outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.' Id. Article 27 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly requires that States protect women against
rape and enforced prostitution. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV] ("Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their hon-
our, in particular against rape.").
Rape has been interpreted as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, despite
the fact that it is not explicitly included in the laundry list defining such offenses. See,
e.g., Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 783 (1995) (recognizing rape as a grave breach). Grave
breaches are those acts against persons protected by the Geneva Conventions in an
international armed conflict, for which states must seek out and prosecute or extradite
the perpetrators. Rape has been interpreted as a grave breach under the crime of'tor-
ture or inhuman treatment' and/or 'wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health'. Geneva Conventions I-IV arts. 50, 51, 130, and 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75




torture,18 6 a crime against humanity, 8 7 an act of genocide,1 8 8 and a
186. Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as:
[Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is in-
tentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain and suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/
39/51 (June 26, 1987). Rape can be an act of torture. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOCI, Comm. on Human Rights, Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture,
Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411995/34 (Jan. 12, 1995). See also Prosecutor
v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-PT, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998) amended Indictment
(June 2, 1998) (convicting a defendant of torture for aiding and abetting rape).
The ICTR emphasized that rape can amount to torture in many instances, includ-
ing when it is 'used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, or dis-
crimination, punishment, control, or destruction of a person.' Further, 'Rape in fact
constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or ac-
quiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.' Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at 598. The 'official capacity' requirement is waning in con-
temporary customary international law. The ICC Statute, for example, does not neces-
sarily require official capacity to constitute torture, including sexual torture. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183.9, 37 I.L.M. 1002. See also Kelly Dawn Askin, Developments in International
Criminal Law: Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and
Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 Am. J. OF INTER. L. 97, 110 (1999) (providing an
analysis of sexual violence as treated in the international tribunals).
187. Crimes against humanity are 'inhumane acts of a very serious nature ... com-
mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.' The Secretary-General, Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 48,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). The ICTR Statute explicitly includes rape as a crime
against humanity. Id.
188. Sexual violence, in some circumstances, can be considered an act of genocide.
See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (holding that rape can be an act of genocide). Geno-
cide is defined under international instruments, including the Genocide Convention and
the ICTR Statute, as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. See also Catherine A. MacKinnon,
Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide, MS (1993), at 27 ("[Tlhe world
has never seen sex used this sciously, this cynically, this elaborately, this openly, this
systematically, with this degree of technology and psychological sophistication, as a
means of destroying a whole people.").
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grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. i8 9 The key issue is not the
existence of adequate legal protections, but "'in the international com-
munity's willingness to tolerate sexual abuse of women. '" 190
i. The ICTR is an ad hoc international tribunal that has
jurisdiction over crimes of sexual violence committed during the
genocide.
The UN Security Council created the ICTR on November 8, 1994,
to prosecute those "'responsible for genocide and other serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States." 19 1
The Tribunal, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, has primacy over
national courts both in Rwanda and in the rest of the world. 19 2 It is
designed to focus prosecution efforts on the central core of individuals
who planned and orchestrated the genocide, in an effort to hold those
individuals accountable for their actions and to deter others "'who
may be tempted in the future to perpetuate such atrocities by showing
them that the international community shall not tolerate the serious
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights."
1 9 3
Without regard to what are arguably material differences be-
tween the circumstances of the two post-conflict situations, the Secur-
ity Council used the ICTY Statute as a model when creating the
ICTR. 19 4 In fact, while the ICTR is a separate entity with its own
trial judges and administration, the same person who served as chief
prosecutor for the ICTY served in that capacity for the ICTR until
very recently. 195 Furthermore, the ICTR adopted the same rules of
189. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 14, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3526, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion IV].
190. Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo: Rape as a
Weapon of 'Ethnic Cleansing' (2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/fry/kosov003-04.
htm#P497108434.
191. ICTR Statute, supra note 181; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T,
Judgment, 2 (Dec. 6, 1999). It is worth noting, however, that the international commu-
nity, including the U.S. government, has not always been fully cooperative with ICTR
efforts at securing accountability. For a detailed discussion, see Robert Kushen & Ken-
neth J. Harris, Surrender of Fugitives by the United States to the War Crimes Tribunals
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AM. J. OF INT'L. L. 254 (1996).
192. United Nations Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(2007), available at http:1169.94.11.53/ENGLISH/.basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf.
193. Id.
194. Id. One often cited difference is that the ICTY is meant to cover a conflict that
was largely international, while the ICTR has jurisdiction over an exclusively internal
conflict. Askin, supra note 186, at 121.




evidence and procedure that were developed for the ICTY. 19 6 At the
time the ICTR was established, commentators believed that the deci-
sion to follow the ICTY model and link the two tribunals had a variety
of benefits, both administrative and legal-including cost, start-up
time, and consistency in substantive law and procedure. 197 Others be-
lieve that the use of the ICTY mechanism as boilerplate for the ICTR
demonstrated a lack of understanding of material differences between
the two conflicts.
There has been consistent tension between the ICTR and domes-
tic courts in Rwanda. In fact, the Rwandan government resisted the
formation of the ICTR, casting the only vote against its establishment,
believing that justice must come from within. 19s Furthermore, be-
cause the ICTR and the Rwandan government share jurisdiction, both
entities have on occasion sought custody over the same suspects and
access to the same witnesses. 199 This conflict becomes particularly
notable in the case of Category 1 offenders, who are subject to the
death penalty under Rwanda's domestic genocide law but not under
the ICTR.20 0 In 1996, the ICTR gained custody of some allegedly key
leaders of the genocide for whom the Rwandan government had issued
196. See USIP Special Report, supra note 127, at 5 (discussing the interplay be-
tween the ICTR and ICTY).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 6. The UN Commission of Experts, prior to the establishment of the
ICTR, published a report arguing that prosecution 'would better be undertaken by an
international, rather than a municipal, tribunal,' warning that decisions made by na-
tional courts would be perceived not as justice but as mere retribution. Id. It was
thought that a non-national tribunal would have more administrative capabilities and
infrastructure, including trained staff and officers of the court; that it would be able to
more effectively advance the development and enforcement of international norms of
criminal law; that there would be a greater perception of impartiality and indepen-
dence; and that it would convey to the world that the international community will not
tolerate the type of violence that occurred in the Rwandan genocide. Id.
199. In one instance, the ICTR granted a stay of proceedings where one and a half
years had passed from the time of arrest to the detainee's being charged in the national
courts. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19, Decision (Nov. 3, 1999).
Barayagwiza was a central figure in the genocide, believed to have established a radio
station used to incite the violence. Stephane Bourgon, Remarks on the Rights of the
Accused, The International Criminal Court Summer Course, Irish Centre for Human
Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway (July 24, 2003) (notes on file with au-
thor). The Rwandan government took a political stand, threatening non-cooperation
with the Tribunal if it released Barayagwiza. Id. In what is largely believed to be a
political move, the prosecutor sought an appeal based on the discovery of 'new facts,'
and the decision was overturned. Id. See also Amnesty International, Gacaca: A Ques-
tion of Justice, n. 13, AFR 47/007/2002, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/AFR47/007/2002/en/AFR470072002en.html (discussing justice in the ICTR).
200. In a few cases, the ICTR has sentenced defendants to life terms, specifically
noting that had those individuals been convicted in Rwanda's domestic court system,
they would have been sentenced to death. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 916, Judgment (May 21, 1999).
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arrest warrants. 20 1 The Rwandan government controls access to wit-
nesses and crime sites in the region and has, at times, denied access to
ICTR investigative teams. 20 2 The Tribunal, on the other hand, has
escalated tensions by issuing many indictments against individuals
operating under the auspices of the former Rwandan government.20 3
These tensions between the ICTR and the Rwandan government in-
terfere with the channels of justice and frustrate the efficiency of an
already stretched judicial system.
ii. National courts in Rwanda share jurisdiction with the ICTR
over crimes of sexual violence, with laws that differ in
substance and procedure.
The Government of National Unity decided early on that it would
punish the perpetrators of the genocide, and has made it "'among the
highest priorities to apprehend and bring [them] to justice."' 20 4 The
government has opted for extensive judicial prosecution as the princi-
ple mechanism by which to secure the rule of law, promote order, and,
purportedly, reconcile a broken country.20 5
While Rwanda had ratified the Genocide Convention, it had not
provided in its Penal Code for procedures for the imposition of punish-
ments for the offences of genocide and crimes against humanity. 20 6
The Organic Law No. 08/96 on the Organization of Prosecutions for
Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Hu-
manity Committed Since October 1, 1990 ("Law No. 8/96")207 did just
201. These individuals included Andre Ntagerura, Anatole Nsengiyumva, The-
oneste Bagosora, Ferdinand Nahimana, Laurent Semanza, and Jean-Bosco Bary-
agwiza, who is the defendant mentioned above. Amnesty International, supra note 199,
at n. 13. Rwandan genocide survivors' groups AVEGA and IBUKA have also refused to
testify before the ICTR, stating that they would not cooperate with 'people who ridicule
us and treat our suffering as a banality.' Id. at 7.
202. Id.
203. Id. These indictments may have played a part in the petition of the Rwandan
government to the Security Council to replace the ICTR prosecutor. See generally supra
note 194 and accompanying text.
204. The Government of Rwanda, Genocide & Justice, www.gov.rw/government/ge-
nocide.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
205. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1286 (Nov. 2000). See also Special Report of the Inter-
national Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
and the Surrounding Events, ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY, para. 18.3 (discussing
the implementation of domestic judicial prosecutions).
206. For a detailed discussion of Rwandan national law, see WILLIAM A. ScHABAS &
MARTIN IMBLEAU, INTRODUCTION TO RwANDAN LAw (1997).
207. Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide
or Crimes Against Humanity Committed since October 1, 1990, Organic Law No. 08/96
(1996) (Rwanda), available at www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm
[hereinafter Law No. 8/96].
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that.208 In theory, Law No. 8/96 takes a holistic approach to rectifying
communal wrongs arising out of the genocide. Law No. 8/96 encom-
passes "crimes against humanity," potentially bringing within its am-
bit violence, including sexual violence, which would not fall within the
elements of genocide. 20 9 While the subject matter jurisdiction is
there, the contours of its practical application, disappointingly, re-
main to be tested.
Law No. 8/96 creates four categories of offences indicating the de-
gree of individual responsibility and respective penalties. 210 Sexual
torture is considered to be a Category 1 offense. 211 However, the con-
cept of "sexual torture" under Rwandan domestic law has not been
adequately addressed, either by statute or case law in the domestic
system. In fact, sexual violence has played an extremely minor part in
domestic genocide trials. Law No. 8/96 was designed to provide spe-
cially adapted measures to satisfy the need for justice of the people of
Rwanda. 212 According to unofficial commentaries, it seeks to "'allow
the return of social peace among Rwanda's people through legitimate
tribunals judging on the basis of legal principles that are clearly es-
tablished."' 213 However, these legal principles can only satisfy the
need for justice in their practical application to Rwandan citizens.
208. Law No. 8/96 consists of special measures streamlining and isolating crimes
sanctioned by the Penal Code that were committed between October 1, 1990 and Decem-
ber 31, 1994. Law No. 8/96 supra note 207. The crimes are effectively divided into three
categories: (1) genocide; (2) crimes against humanity; and (3) collateral offences, includ-
ing offences enumerated in the Rwandan Penal Code allegedly committed in connection
with events surrounding the genocide and crimes against humanity. Id. at art. 1, 2.
209. Id. at arts. 2, 3. As such, the Law No. 8/96 covers three potential types of of-
fenders: (1) members of the Hutu opposition (who, incidentally, may not have opposed
the regime because of its anti-Tutsi policies); (2) participants in the genocide against the
Tutsis; and (3) RPA members whose campaigns resulted in crimes against humanity.
Id.
210. Id. at art. 2. Category 1 offenders include leaders and organizers of the geno-
cide, persons who abused positions of authority, notorious killers who 'by virtue of the
zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities' distinguished themselves
in some way; and perpetrators of sexual torture. Id. Category 2 offenders include the
perpetrators of or accomplices to intentional homicide or serious assaults against indi-
viduals that led to their death. Id. Category 3 includes persons guilty of other serious
assaults against individuals, and Category 4 includes property offences. Id. There is an
automatic death penalty for Category 1 offenders. Id.
211. Id.
212. Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences
Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Between
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, Organic Law, No. 40/2000, preamble (2001)
(Rwanda) [hereinafter Law No. 40/2000].
213. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE STUDY AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INFORMATION, THE GENOCIDE AND THE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN RWANDAN LAW,
Commentary at 4 (prologue) (1997).
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iii. The gacaca is a form of traditional justice that also has
jurisdiction over some crimes of sexual violence and has a
distinct penalty structure.
There is yet a third forum that has jurisdiction over crimes of sex-
ual violence committed during the genocide in Rwanda, with yet an-
other system of operation and a distinct penalty structure. In what is
effectively a populist response to a populist genocide, Rwanda has im-
plemented a form of traditional justice known as gacaca to comple-
ment the efforts of national courts and the ICTR. 2 14 The gacaca
system is a remarkable advancement in transitional justice, arguably
unique both in the complexity of the issues it seeks to address and the
way in which it seeks to achieve those goals.
Gacaca is the Kinyarwanda word for grass, and the present incar-
nation of gacaca is based on a traditional justice system in Rwanda of
the same name, in which community elders (called inyangamugayo, or
persons of integrity) would sit on the grass and resolve community
conflicts. 2 15 Under the traditional gacaca system, when disputes
arose-over property, marital disputes, or inheritance, for example-
the parties would come before the community and the inyangamugayo
to seek a solution.2 16 The primary goal of the gacaca system "was to
restore social order, after sanctioning the violation of shared values,
through the re-integration of offender(s) into the community."2 1 7
Even throughout the time of colonial rule and thereafter, gacaca ses-
sions remained an integral part of the community, in some cases be-
214. Law No. 40/2000, supra note 212.
215. For general information on the gacaca system, see Government of Rwanda, In-
troduction on Gacaca, http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnIntroduction.htm (last
visited Apr. 26, 2008); Fondation Hirondelle, Law on Traditional Courts Declared Con-
stitutional (Feb. 16, 2001), http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/0/9117deleb28f7a
4241256beb006b4bc7; Fondation Hirondelle, Gacaca Judges to be Elected on October
4th (Aug. 9, 2001), http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/0/9117deleb28f7a4241256b
eb006b4bc7; Jane Ciabattari, Rwanda Gambles on Renewal, not Revenge, WOMEN'S E-
NEWS, Oct. 9, 2000, www.womenenews.org; Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension between Justice
and Reconciliation, in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the
Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide, 45 J. AR. L. 143 (2001); Rwanda Imple-
menting Controversial 'Gacaca' Courts, AFROL.COM, Dec. 1, 2001, www.afrol.com/News/
rwaOl8_gacacacourts3.htm; Laurie Anne Pearlman & Ervin Staub, The Gacaca Pro-
cess as an Avenue toward Healing and Reconciliation, www-unix.oit.umass.edu/-gubin/
rwandasup/gacaca.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2008); International Helsinki Federation
for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda-The Gacaca System and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Oct. 12, 2002) (on file with author); Daly, supra
note 115. See also Ian Fisher, Massacres of '94: Rwanda Seeks Justice in Villages, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999 (explaining that Gacaca 'refers to the grass that village elders once
sat on as they mediated the disputes of rural life in Rwanda.').
216. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 115 (discussing the history of the gacaca courts).
217. Amnesty International, supra note 199, at 14.
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coming institutionalized to the extent that local governmental or
administrative authorities assumed the role of inyangamugayo.
2 1 s
The former President of Rwanda, Pasteur Bizimungu, created a
commission on October 17, 1998, to study the applicability of gacaca to
the trial of genocidaires. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001
("Law No. 40/2000") established gacaca jurisdictions for the prosecu-
tion of genocide offenses and crimes against humanity committed be-
tween October 1, 1990, and December 31, 1994, a law that came into
effect on March 15, 2001.219 Community members elected gacaca
judges in October 2001, using as a basis the traditional election crite-
ria of integrity; among other criteria, the judges are "to be recognized
as having a good behaviour and morals; to be characterized by honesty
and a spirit of sharing speech; . . . (and) to be free from the spirit of
sectarianism and discrimination."2 20 Political appointees, govern-
ment administrators, members of the national police, and career mag-
istrates are excluded from eligibility. 2 2 1
The organizational structure of gacaca is hierarchical, at its low-
est level comprised of nearly 10,000 cells across the country which are
responsible for categorizing criminals according to the structure set
out in Law No. 8/96.222 In order to accomplish this aim, the cells can
use the case files to the extent that such files exist, as well as testi-
mony from the accused and the community assembly. The second
218. Id. Some theorists argue that the gacaca system is inappropriate as applied to
the Rwandan genocide because gacaca has traditionally been used to adjudicate the
relatively minor disputes typical of rural life in Rwanda, over property or petty theft.
Id. However, contrary to popular understanding, use ofgacaca in the case of murder is
not without precedent. Traditionally, under the gacaca system, when a murder had
taken place 'the family of the victim would be allowed to symbolically end the killer's life
by taking him in front of the community and pretending to kill him. However, the killer
would walk away.' Drumbl, supra note 126, at 565 (citing Rwanda Tradition May Rule
Prosecution, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Oct. 9, 1999, at 11A (identifying Tharcisse Karu-
garama, Vice President of Rwanda's Supreme Court, as a supporter of possibilities of
gacaca even for the crime of murder)).
219. Law No. 40/2000, supra note 212.
220. PRESIDENTIAL ORDER No. 12/01 OF 26/6/2001, ESTABLISHING MODALITIES FOR
ORGANIZING ELECTIONS OF MEMBERS OF 'GACACA JURISDICTIONS' ORGANS, art. 7. Article
7 provides, in pertinent part:
Can be elected at the level of the Cell's 'Gacaca Jurisdiction', any person recog-
nized by people as fulfilling the following conditions: (1) to be of Rwandese
nationality; (2) to be living in the Cell where he wants to stand for elections; (3)
to be at least 21 years old; (4) to be recognized as having a good behaviour and
morals; (5) to be characterized by honesty and a spirit of sharing speech; (6) not
having been sentenced, during five years starting from the beginning of elec-
tions, by a trial emanating from the tried case to a penalty of 6 months or more;
(7) not having participated in perpetrating offences of the genocide crime or
crimes against humanity; (8) to be free from the spirit of sectarianism and dis-
crimination; (9) not having been the subject of dismissal for lack of discipline.'
221. Id. at art. 10.
222. Law No. 40/2000, supra note 212, at tit. II.
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phase of gacaca involves trials of the accused, with each level having
competence to judge appeals from the level below. "The progression of
lists, from the most neutral topic of the cell's residents in 1994, to the
lists of the deceased, to the claims for compensation, and finally to the
most sensitive and contentious topic of the accused, allows the assem-
bly to gradually establish a rhythm and atmosphere that can become
more and more refined as the difficulty of the tasks increases."2 2 3
Gacaca courts have jurisdiction over all offenses listed under Law
No. 8/96, with the exception of Category 1 offenses. As discussed be-
low, it is unclear what types of sexual violence will fall within the
practical subject matter jurisdiction of the gacaca courts. While the
gacaca courts share jurisdiction with the domestic courts under Law
No. 8/96, the emphasis on sentencing in the two tribunals is different.
Confession procedures are an extremely important component of the
gacaca system.22 4 Prisoners who confess and ask for forgiveness may
receive dramatic reductions in penalties, up to one half of a given sen-
tence. 2 25 In addition, community service is expected to play a signifi-
cant role in the proceedings; up to half of a sentence may be
transmuted to community service if an accused publicly asks for
forgiveness. 22 6
b. A lack of sensitivity to cultural context makes the gacaca courts
an inappropriate forum for crimes of sexual violence and may
result in an overall lack of justice for victims.
Given the inefficiency of the ICTR and the backlog of cases being
prosecuted in national courts, the gacaca is seen by the Rwandan gov-
ernment, as well as the international community, as a mechanism to
speed up trials and reduce a caseload that would take hundreds of
years to process. 22 7 The post-genocide infrastructure of Rwanda, as
discussed above, is extremely weak; the criminal justice system was
crippled by the death of professionals during the genocide, and the
sheer number of genocide suspects and cases awaiting trial has
stretched the system beyond capacity. 2 28 Prisons are extremely over-
crowded, and the economy is unable to absorb the cost of feeding and
223. GACACA JURISDICTIONS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA (2002), http://www.
convenor.com/madison/PDFGacacaReport.pdf ('Interim Report').
224. Law No. 40/2000, supra note 212, at ch. 2. While confessions are incorporated
dejure into the national courts, there is a disconnect between law and practice. Confes-
sions are granted on a discretionary basis, the procedure for doing so is somewhat pro-
tracted, and the bureaucracy in Rwanda is insufficient to process a large number of
claims.
225. Id. at chs. 2 & 4.
226. Id. at ch. 4.




clothing the detainees.2 29 As of 2001, only approximately 5000 trials
had taken place, with 125,000 detainees awaiting trial in prisons built
to accommodate 10,000 individuals. 230 As of 2003, there were approx-
imately 87,000 detainees in Rwandan prisons. 23 1 A Swedish radio
journalist commented:
I think I understood something of the magnitude of that prob-
lem when I talked to Kibuye Chief Prosecutor Rafael
Ngarumbe, who led the pre-gacaca proceedings in Bisesero.
He has got 250,000 murders and 7000 suspects to investigate.
His staff consists of 12 persons and they have got one vehicle,
unfortunately without petrol.23 2
In an effort to find a practical solution to this situation, gacaca
courts have been established across the country. Gacaca courts, as
discussed above, have jurisdiction over offenses falling under Catego-
ries 2-4 of Law No. 8/96; while this jurisdiction excludes "sexual tor-
ture," crimes of sexual violence falling outside that realm will
potentially be within the scope of the gacaca tribunals. 2 33 Further-
more, Category 1 crimes may soon be within the jurisdiction of the
gacaca: an amendment bill which would "pave way for the quick trial
of a bulk of genocide-related cases" by enabling gacaca courts to try
cases falling under Category 1 has recently been adopted by Rwandan
lawmakers and will now be forwarded to the Parliamentary Commis-
sion for consideration. 23 4 The particular cultural operatives at play
with regard to crimes of sexual violence, however, may mean that
these crimes do not in fact get dealt with in this setting, and conse-
229. Id.
230. Amnesty International, supra note 199.
231. Press Release, Amnesty 'International, Rwanda: End of Provisional Release of
Genocide Suspects (Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/as-
set/AFR47/005/2003/en/AFR470052003en.html.
232. Excerpt from radio program, Genocide in Paradise, Radio Sweden (Dec. 8,
2001) (from a visit to a pre-gacaca hearing in Bisesero, Kibuye).
233. See Law 40/2000, supra note 212. There is some apparent confusion regarding
the jurisdiction of gacaca tribunals over types of sexual violence. In one pre-gacaca
hearing, the prosecutor announced that 'anyone who attacked a woman, especially in a
sexual way, will be considered a major criminal' and 'fall in Category 1' (thus outside
the scope of the gacaca jurisdiction). GACACA, supra note 137. However, in another
gacaca proceeding, the prosecutor asked a witness directly and openly for testimony
regarding rape:
Prosecutor: Were there rapes?
Witness: Sorry?
Prosecutor: Did they rape you?
Witness: No. But another boy still in prison had a piece of wood this big (hold-
ing up her arm), with which he raped the wives of the Tutsi.
Id.
234. Sulah Nuwamanya, Gacaca Courts to get more Powers, WEEKLY OBSERVER,
Mar. 6, 2008, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200803060759.html.
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quently fall through the cracks, whether or not those crimes are di-
rectly within the jurisdiction of the gacaca.
Sexual crimes are heavily stigmatized in Rwanda, and both the
physical and the psychological traumas suffered by the victims are ag-
gravated by ostracization by the community and a sense of isola-
tion.2 3 5 Rwandan women generally do not discuss their experiences
out of a fear that they will be rejected by their family or community or
will be considered "unmarriageable" as a result.2 36 It has been noted
that words to describe some sexual acts do not even exist in Kinyar-
wanda. 23 7 Many fear revenge or retribution from their attacker(s) if
they speak out.238 The gacaca tribunals are simply not designed to
accommodate this cultural context. In the laws governing the gacaca
courts, there are no specialized victim protection mechanisms or wit-
ness protection mechanisms for these women. Exacerbating this prob-
lem is the fact that there will be no counsel representing them during
the hearings. 23 9 In short, within this cultural context, it is extremely
unlikely that these survivors will stand up in front of their entire com-
munity and discuss the details of sexual violence committed against
them. Where the gacaca tribunals are meant to alleviate caseload of
the national courts, and where that caseload includes crimes of sexual
violence, the gacaca courts may simply be unable to serve as a venue
for justice for the victims and survivors because of a lack of considera-
tion of the surrounding cultural context.
c. The Akayesu Judgment of the ICTR was a watershed event for
victims of sexual violence because it used the context of the
Rwandan genocide to hold that rape could be a form of genocide
under international law.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu 240 was the first case to convict a defendant
for crimes of sexual violence under international law.2 4 1 In doing so,
the ICTR adopted a definition of sexual violence that would serve as
an overarching principle of law while allowing room for context in its
application. In an extremely detailed and lengthy opinion, the Tribu-
nal emphasized context with regard to both the elements of the crime
and the mens rea required. It acknowledged the legal importance of
235. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIvEs, supra note 148, at 3.
236. Id.
237. Violence against Women, supra note 143, at Part III.A, 50.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., GACACA, supra note 137 (providing a local prosecutor instructed the
Gacaca participants at Ntongwe Communal Lockup: "Your lawyer will be your neigh-
bor, your prosecutor will be your neighbor, your judge will be your neighbor.").
240. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T.
241. Id. at 696, 697. For a general discussion of the Akayesu Judgment relative to
other cases of the ICTR and the ICTY, see Askin, supra note 186.
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the factual particulars, and held that rape can be an act of genocide in
its own right.24 2
Jean Paul Akayesu was bourgmestre (mayor) of the Taba com-
mune, located near Kigali. 24 3 As bourgmestre, he was in charge of the
communal police and was responsible for maintaining public order
within the commune. 24 4 Akayesu was an academic and was ap-
pointed to his political post by then President Habyarimana in
1991.245 Evidence submitted at trial indicated that Akayesu initially
attempted to prevent violence in the Taba commune. 2 46 The court
found, however, that after a meeting calling for support of the
bourgmestres in the genocide, Akayesu participated in the violence
both actively and through passive facilitation of crimes. 2 47 The court
records show that at least two thousand Tutsis were killed in Taba
during the months of May and June 1994 while he was in power. 248
Akayesu was the first time an international court punished sexual
violence in an internal armed conflict. 24 9 However, rape was not in-
cluded in the initial indictment against Akayesu.2 50 It was only when
the Tribunal heard consistent and repeated evidence of sexual vio-
lence, and came under a significant amount of pressure from non-gov-
ernmental organizations ("NGOs") that the indictment was amended
to cover these crimes. 25 1
242. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at I 698-734. See also William A. Schabas,
Commentary, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment
(Sept. 2, 1998), in Andr6 Klip & Goran Sliiter, ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: VOLUME II, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 1994-1999, 541 (2001).
243. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at 9IT9 1, 54.
244. Id. at I 54, 55, 77.
245. Id. at IT 6, 51, 52.
246. Id. at 52, 55.
247. Id. at IT 637-744.
248. Id. at 91 181.
249. Id. I 416-60 (particularly discussing evidence of sexual violence).
250. See Akayesu Indictment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, amended (June 1997) (includ-
ing rape as amended); Akayesu, Case No. 1 CTR-96-4-T, at 1 6 (discussing the
amendments).
251. Akayesu, Case No. 1 CTR-96-4-T, at 91 6; Margaret A. Lyons, Note, Hearing the
Cry without Answering the Call: Rape, Genocide, and the Rwandan Tribunal, 28 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 99, 105 (2001). Lyons provided the following:
A Tutsi woman testified in front of the Tribunal that three Hutu soldiers raped
her six year old daughter when they came to kill her husband. The same wit-
ness, referred to as witness J, also testified that she heard of young girls raped
at the communal. Witness H testified that she did not know if Akayesu knew
about the abuse... After hearing witness testimony regarding sexual assaults,
Judge Pillay amended the indictment to include the crime of rape as genocide.
Judge Pillay was the only woman on the panel.
Id. The NGO Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situations (the 'Coali-
tion') filed an amicus brief that proved influential in the Tribunal's decision to amend
the indictment. Brief for NGO Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situa-
tions as Amicus Curiae Respecting Amendment of the Indictment and Supplementation
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In defining rape, the Tribunal moved away from a description of
objects and acts toward a contextual approach that it found to be
"more useful in international law."25 2 Without this broad construc-
tion, it is possible that many acts of sexual violence that occurred dur-
ing the genocide would not fit the legal definition. The Tribunal
reasoned that "sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of
the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetra-
tion or even physical contact," including forced nudity.2 53 The ICTR
defined sexual violence as any act of a sexual nature committed on a
person under circumstances that are coercive. 2 54 It recognized that
"the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a
mechanical description of objects and body parts" and noted "the cul-
tural sensitivities involved in public discussion of intimate matters"
and recalled "the painful reluctance and inability of witnesses to dis-
close graphic anatomical details of sexual violence they endured."2 55
The Tribunal determined that rape is a form of genocide, in so far as it
constitutes serious bodily or mental harm pursuant to paragraph 3(b)
of the ICTR Statute.25 6
The ICTR also held that rape fell under paragraph (d). 25 7 It held
that, under Article 2, measures intended to prevent births could be
sexual mutilation, sterilization, separation of the sexes, or forced birth
control. The deliberate rape of a woman with intent to impregnate her
falls within the scope of this provision in patriarchal societies where
membership of the group moves through the father. The Tribunal fur-
ther interpreted serious mental or bodily injury to include all acts of
torture, persecution, and inhumane treatment.
By applying the law with regard to the context involved, the Tri-
bunal found that the sexual violence in question satisfied the elements
of the Evidence to Ensure the Prosecution of Rape and Other Sexual Violence Within
the Competence of the Tribunal (May 1997) (on file with author). The Coalition is a
group of more than 100 organizations related to women's human rights in conflict situa-
tions. Id. It is coordinated by the International Center for Human Rights and Demo-
cratic Development, in Montreal, Canada. Id.
252. Akayesu Case No. 1CTR-96-4-T, at 91 687-88. According to the Tribunal, rape
is:
[A] physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circum-
stances which are coercive... Sexual violence, which includes rape, is consid-
ered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive.
Id.
253. Id. at 91 6, 596-98, 688.
254. Id. at 1 598.
255. Id. at 91 687.
256. Id. at I 731-35.
257. Id. at $1 731-34.
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of genocide. 258 It held that the rapes were systematic and discrimina-
tory. Acts of sexual violence often preceded murder, and were used for
the destruction of the Tutsi will to live.25 9 While the Tribunal ac-
knowledged that murder followed rape in many cases, it determined
that the rape itself constituted an act of genocide. 260 In order to find
Akayesu guilty of genocide, it had to find intent. The ICTR expanded
the mens rea requirement for command responsibility to include con-
structive intent-that is, inferring intent where a superior knows or
should have known that his or her subordinates were about to, or al-
ready had, committed an act.26 1
The ICTR convicted Akayesu of genocide (including commission of
genocide, and direct and public incitement to commit genocide) and
crimes against humanity (including extermination, murder, torture,
rape, and other inhumane acts).26 2 The ICTR failed to convict him for
violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (including
murder and cruel treatment) and Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol
II (including outrage upon personal dignity, in particular rape, de-
grading and humiliating treatment, and indecent assault).263 The
Tribunal found that the Prosecutor had not proved beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the acts committed by Akayesu in the Taba commune
during the time period alleged in the Indictment "were committed in
conjunction with the armed conflict"2 64 or that he had acted either for
the Government or as a member of the armed forces under military
command. 265
2. Justice for women victims of sexual violence will be enhanced
where it is premised on an acknowledgement of existent
inequalities.
The woman must be fertile, hard-working, and reserved. She
must learn the art of silence and reserve. 266
258. Id. Beverly Allen, a scholar on rape as a form of genocide, posits that rape is a
form of 'biological warfare' and constitutes genocide. BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE:
THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA (1996).
259. Evidence showed that many rapes took place at mass graves to facilitate easy
disposal of the bodies. Akayesu, Case No. 1 CTR-96-4-T, at 733. Further, evidence
showed that following a particularly brutal gang rape, Akayesu said, Tromorrow they
will be killed'. Id.
260. Id. at $1 731-34.
261. Id. at 488-89; Lyons, supra note 251, at 108-09.
262. Akayesu, Case No. 1 CTR-96-4-T, at 654-744.
263. Id. at 638-44.
264. Id. at 1 643.
265. Id.
266. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 148, at 20 (citing The
Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONf.177/20 (Oct.
17, 1995) [hereinafter Conference on Women]).
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The status of women in Rwandan society is one of distinct ine-
quality; this inequality clearly and effectively exacerbated the violence
experienced by women during the genocide. 26 7 In order to seek justice
for the survivors, it is essential that legal operatives and program-
matic advances take into account the social, political, and economic
realities of their subjects. This section will discuss some of the exis-
tent inequalities that inhere within Rwandan society, and how those
inequalities affect the quest for justice for women victims of sexual
violence.
a. Domestic violence is deeply entrenched in the fabric of Rwandan
society.
Even outside the context of genocide, Rwandan women are in
large proportions subject to violence at the hands of their partners or
family members. The Rwandan National Report to the Fourth World
Conference on Women states that one-fifth of all Rwandan women
have been victims of domestic violence by their male partners.268 Wo-
men's groups estimate this figure to be much higher.26 9 A common
Rwandan proverb states "that a woman who is not yet battered is not
a real woman."2 70
b. Victims of sexual violence may be unable to obtain necessary
medical care.
Women in Rwanda do not receive adequate health care, and the
health care system has fallen far short in its abilities to address the
needs of women victims of sexual violence. Sixty-three percent of all
deaths of women in 1993-even before the medical infrastructure was
decimated in the genocide-were due to inadequate reproductive
health care. 27 1 The Special Rapporteur noted that the health services
in Rwanda were entirely unable to address the physical needs of wo-
men victims of sexual violence;2 72 in 1997 there were only five
gynaecologists in the whole of Rwanda. 2 73 The "health services
seemed insensitive to women's needs, and only after constant ques-
267. Id. at 12-13.
268. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 148, at 13 (citing Confer-
ence on Women, supra note 266); Violence against Women, supra note 143, at sec. I.
269. Violence against Women, supra note 143, at sec. I.
270. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LrvES, supra note 148, at 13.
271. Id. at 13, 21.
272. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 148, at 38 ('(T]he most
common medical problems were sexually transmitted diseases, such as syphilis, gonor-
rhea or vaginitis. Other medical problems include AIDS, vesico-vaginal fistula, trauma,
mutilation, complications from botched abortions and psychological problems.').
273. Violence against Women, supra note 143, at sec. I, 36.
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tioning did health officials admit that sexual violence required a very
specialized medical approach."27
4
c. While women make up a majority of Rwandan citizenry, they
enjoy very little political power.
Women's participation in the government has been low. Women
never comprised more than 17% of the National Assembly, and only
3.2% of local government officials were female.2 75 Given these stark
demographic inequalities, it is particularly striking that women in
post-genocide Rwanda now comprise 50% of the heads of house-
hold. 2 7 6 Women currently comprise, in fact, approximately 70% of the
entire population of Rwanda. 27 7
i. A lack of consideration for these existent inequalities could
hamper the success of the gacaca tribunals.
The gacaca tribunals depend directly upon community participa-
tion for their success. However, women may have a difficult time par-
ticipating in the process, because they have historically been excluded
from participation in gacaca hearings. Women may consequently be
reluctant to participate, and uncomfortable with the process if and
when they do. A long-standing tradition of discrimination, in a tribu-
nal that has as its main selling point its long-standing tradition, may
lead to the exclusion of women's voices.
Perhaps in part to accommodate these concerns and educate the
public about the "reconstituted" gacaca tribunals, a variety of mecha-
nisms have been used to heighten awareness, to educate, and to train
the public about the gacaca system. The Rwandan government, as
well as members of the international community, have spearheaded
mass information dissemination, education, and training programs
geared equally toward educating participants and garnering sup-
port. 2 7 8 Based on research showing that community leaders are
sources of information for the community at large, such leaders were
trained especially to serve as informants about the gacaca process, in-
cluding training in general communication techniques. 2 79 Printed
materials and "gacaca kits" were disseminated, which contained re-
274. Id.
275. Id. at sec. I, 20.
276. Id. at sec. I, 22.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Inkiko Gacaca, http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/ (last visited Apr. 21,
2008) (providing information about these activities).
279. Johns Hopkins Center for Communication Programs, Rwanda: Gacaca, http:l!
www.jhuccp.org/africa/rwanda/gacaca.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) [hereinafter
Hopkins, Rwanda].
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search, handouts, badges, and "aide memoires."28 0 Weekly radio spots
were broadcast on local radio programs, as well as a bi-weekly radio
talk show that was produced and aired on Rwanda Radio to cover as-
pects of the gacaca law.28 1 Efforts at imparting knowledge, garnering
support, and increasing widespread participation in the gacaca pro-
cess filtered down into social and cultural life, as well; there was a
gacaca song competition, educational sessions were held during soccer
matches, and one of Rwanda's top theatre troupes produced a gacaca
play.28 2 It is unclear, however, to what extent these campaigns
targeted women and their participation in the process. Because of the
historical prohibition on women's participation, combined with the ex-
istent economic, social and political inequalities discussed in this sec-
tion, it is crucial for the success of the gacaca that it address these
issues directly.
d. Reforms in laws governing land ownership in Rwanda are
demonstrative of legal efforts to recognize existent inequalities
and remedy them in the interest of achieving justice for women
survivors.
These changing proportions have led to legislative reform that
takes into account existent inequalities in an effort to bring justice to
Rwandan women as they assume new roles in society. Perhaps one of
the most important reforms has occurred with regard to land owner-
ship and economic empowerment. Prior to the genocide, women could
not inherit land, nor were they eligible for credit or loans.28 3 In fact,
wives were not permitted to be employed or engage in commercial ac-
tivity without the express authorization of their husbands. 28 4 While
Rwanda has yet to adopt a national land policy, two important devel-
opments have occurred in this area. First, the government imple-
mented the imidugudu policy, which resettled refugees and displaced
persons on their original lands. Under this policy, many women re-
turned to the lands that were held in the past by their families.
28 5
Secondly, after intense lobbying by NGOs and the international com-
280. Id. Throughout this time, efforts were made to conduct research on Rwandan
attitudes toward and knowledge of the gacaca. Id. Overall, these efforts were success-
ful: An estimated 2.7 million people were exposed to educational messages through ra-
dio spots and talk shows. Id. More than 250,000 people read handouts on the gacaca
process. Id. More than 200,000 followed the cartoon strip. More than 120,000 people
listened regularly to the gacaca radio drama. Id. More than 65,000 watched the gacaca




284. Human Rights Watch, Women's Property Rights Violation in Sub-Saharan Af-




munity, Rwanda passed an Inheritance Law in 1999.286 The succes-
sion law explicitly recognizes the equal right of Rwandan female and
male children to inheritance and ownership of land and property.
28 7
Under this law, couples are also afforded the opportunity to choose
between distinct property regimes upon marriage, effectively increas-
ing married women's rights to land.2 88
These developments have three important weaknesses, however.
First, the property protections apply only to civil law marriages, thus
excluding a large percentage of the population who have been married
according to local custom. 2 8 9 Secondly, inheritance rights are limited
to "legitimate" children-that is, children born outside of a civil union
do not fall under the scope of the Inheritance Law.290 This exclusion
directly affects women who are victims of sexual violence and who
have borne children as a result of that violence. Finally, and ironi-
cally, the property protections may be entirely inapplicable to land,
because the Rwandan government itself technically owns all land.29 1
3. Post-conflict solutions will empower women victims of sexual
violence in Rwanda where they incorporate consideration of
unchosen relationships.
Later, I found out that I was pregnant and I was unhappy. I
thought about having an abortion, but I was afraid of dying. I
knew that I was going to have an unwanted child and that I
was not able to look after a baby. But I didn't want to behave
like an Interahamwe and abandon my baby .... Almost all
my family members have refused to accept the baby-it is a
child of an Interahamwe. They have told me that they do not
want a child of wicked people. They always tell me that when
my baby grows up they will not give him a parcel of land. I
don't know what is going to happen to him. 29 2
286. Id.
287. Women's Land and Property Rights in Situations of Conflict and Reconstruc-
tion: A Reader Based on the February 1998 Inter-Regional Consultation, in Kigali,
Rwanda, UNDP. 16-19 (Feb. 1998). This includes the Kigali Plan of Action of 1998; U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, Implementation of the Human Rights of Women: The Role and Equal Partic-
ipation of Women in Development, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/L.29 (Aug. 17, 1998).
See also Ministry for Lands, Human Resettlement & Environmental Protection, Brook-
ings Initiative in Rwanda: Land and Human Settlements (Nov. 2001); Robin Palmer,
Oxfam GB Land Adviser, A Review for LandNet Rwanda of the Draft National Land
Policy-and Beyond (Nov. 2001).




292. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LivEs, supra note 148, at 41.
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Among the most important types of unchosen relationships exper-
ienced by women victims of sexual violence in Rwanda are the chil-
dren borne of that violence. Out of the estimated 250,000 women who
were raped during the time period from 1990 to 1994, it is estimated
that 30,000 pregnancies resulted.2 9 3 Health workers in the Kigali and
Kabgayi hospitals estimated that between six to seven out of ten
pregnancies that they saw in the months after September 1994 were
the result of wartime rape.2 94 A study conducted by UNICEF and the
Rwanda Ministry of Family and Promotion of Women indicated that
thirty-five percent of rape survivors had become pregnant. 29 5
Women often could not bear the thought of having a child as a
result of the violence perpetrated against them. Some women per-
formed self-induced abortions at great risk to their health, some com-
mitted suicide, some committed infanticide, and others abandoned
their children after birth. 29 6 One doctor stated that some women
would not reveal that they had been raped, and then cry out, "my child
is an Interahamwe!" during the birth.2 97 Many women who did accept
their children were subject to their families' rejection of them and
their babies. 29 8 With regard to the succession law, discussed above,
the lack of consideration of unchosen relationships leads to a denial of
justice. 299 "The women who have had children after being raped are
the most marginalzed. People say this is the child of an
Interahamwe."3 0 0
a. Reforms in laws governing land ownership in Rwanda are
inadequate where they discriminate against women victims of
sexual violence.
While inheritance law reforms have received much favourable
press, they discriminate against women victims of sexual violence in
three ways: First, (and as discussed in the previous section), children
who have been born to rape victims do not fall within these protection
mechanisms. Secondly, women may themselves fall outside the ambit
293. Rwanda Launches Anti-Sexual Violence Programme, Aug. 6, 2002, http://www.
gov.rw/government/060802.html (last visited May 16, 2008).
294. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LrvEs, supra note 148, at 39-40 (citing Bon-
net, Le viol des femmes survivantes du genocide du Rwanda 23) (on file with author).
295. Id. at 40 (citing Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Family, and the Promotion
of Women, Enquete effectuee aupres des victims) (on file with author).
296. Id. at 40-41.
297. Id. (citing Interview by Human Rights Watch/FIDH with Dr. Nyiramilimo
Odette, Le Bon Samaritain Clinic, in Kigali (Mar. 18, 1996)).
298. Id.
299. Human Rights Watch, supra note 284.
300. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LivEs, supra note 148, at 36 (citing Inter-
view by Human Rights Watch/FIDH with Godelieva Mukasarasi, Rdseau des femmes,
in Taba, Egypt (Mar. 26, 1996)).
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of the property protections: Women who have been victims of sexual
violence incur much stigma in Rwandan society, including being con-
sidered "unmarriageable."3 0 1 Women who are "unmarriageable" will,
by extension, not be afforded the property protections because they
will not be within the context of a civil law marriage. 30 2 Third, wo-
men also may face discrimination where they have given birth to a
child following the death of the father in the genocide. Because many
women are reluctant to discuss sexual violence, 30 3 children born after
the genocide to a woman whose husband is deceased may be ostra-
cized by the community, even if that child was conceived within the
bonds of marriage. 30 4
4. Women victims of sexual violence in Rwanda will be empowered
by legal frameworks that emphasize mutual interdependence over
autonomy or independence.
Prosecutor: Why do we wish to present prisoners like you to
the people?
Prisoner: So you can rebuild the country.
Prosecutor: So we can rebuild!
Prisoner: So we rebuild Rwanda.
Prosecutor: Yes, you included.
Prisoner: That's the reason, so people don't stay in jail but
become reconciled to build a new Rwanda instead of tearing
each other apart. That's the aim of these laws.
Prosecutor: Yes, that's right, what else?
Prisoner: Also because the country can't rebuild, as it lacks
manpower.
Prosecutor: Because of the 100,000 people in prison?
Prisoner: And because others spend their time feeding us.
301. Id. at 36-37.
302. Human Rights Watch, supra note 284.
303. Id. ("Many of the Rwandan women who have been raped do not dare reveal
publicly that they have been raped.").
304. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIvEs, supra note 148, at 37 (citing Inter-
view by Human Rights WatchIFIDH Interview with Ester Mujawayo, Ass'n for Widows
of the Apr. Genocide, in Kigali, Rwanda (Mar. 18, 1996). Another type of unchosen
relationship that must be considered is the vast number of war widows in Rwanda.
Over twenty-two percent of all women over the age of twenty-one are widowed. Id. at
35. War widows may similarly be discriminated against with regard to property laws.
Id. The psychological trauma that war widows experience in post-genocide Rwanda is
striking. Id. The Human Rights Watch provides as follows:
In the past there was respect for widows. Now there is nothing. You are noth-
ing if you are a widow now. We have always been considered lower than a
man. But now as a woman without a husband, a brother, a father, or an uncle,
you are nothing. The widows are isolated by the community. You don't get
invited to community events. People forget to invite you to weddings. People
forget you. You are alone. It's a feeling of being really isolated.
Id. at 35, 37.
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Prosecutor: But we must also replenish our hearts. That the
survivors forgive and the others seek forgiveness. For the
country to be reborn.30 5
The gacaca courts, in effect, are premised on the idea that justice
in a community can be achieved through active realization of the in-
terdependence of its members. The Gacaca Jurisdictions under Law
No. 40/2000 retain certain characteristics of the customary system,
characteristics founded on the tenet of restoration of social harmony
and principles of community. These include a basis in the local com-
munity and participation of community members.
a. Gacaca demonstrates a commitment to justice by effectively
codifying the mutual interdependence of Rwandan people.
The success of gacaca depends directly on the community working
together, openly and vigorously, in the interests of justice and recon-
ciliation. As one prosecutor stated to the prisoners at the Ntongwe
Communal Lockup, "Your lawyer will be your neighbour, your prose-
cutor will be your neighbour, your judge will be your neighbour."30 6
Some scholars argue that current demographics within communi-
ties may adversely impact the success of the gacaca. One of the conse-
quences of the long history of armed conflict and the genocide in
Rwanda is that the composition of communities has changed dramati-
cally, as have the interrelationships of the people that comprise those
communities. Before the genocide began, hundreds of thousands of
Tutsi refugees resided in neighbouring countries. Then, nearly one
million Rwandans were killed during the genocide. Then, tens of
thousands were killed after the RPF took power in July 1994. By the
end of the violence, there were approximately 1.8 million refugees in
countries bordering Rwanda and 400,000 internally displaced per-
sons.30 7 Additionally, the present government has relocated many
Rwandans, in a practice termed "villagization." If a community has
been fractured irreparably-that is, if there is, in fact, no commu-
nity-then success may be difficult to achieve.
Importantly, gacaca enjoys widespread support among
Rwandans. 30 8 As an initial indicator of the potential success of ga-
caca, more than ninety percent of the Rwandan electorate participated
305. GACACA, supra note 137 (providing dialogue between a prosecutor and a pris-
oner at the Ntongwe Communal Lockup).
306. Id.
307. Amnesty International, supra note 199, at 15.
308. Security General, Interim Report, supra note 169, at sec. III ("Gacaca




in electing the judges.30 9 There is hope among the population that
gacaca is the forum within which "the truth will come out."3 10 Such
widespread support is necessary, as the success of gacaca depends di-
rectly on its legitimization by, and participation of, members of the
community. 31 1
While some argue that to rebuild a community there must be a
pre-existent community, I propose that the committed and vigorous
participation of individuals in the process has the potential to in fact
build and strengthen communities, as well as to empower its partici-
pants, by in effect codifying a commitment to mutual interdependence.
Because gacaca requires people within the communities to work to-
gether at a-quite literally-grassroots level, as voters, witnesses,
personnel, and jurors, it will create a common experience of working
together toward a common goal, replacing "the divisive experience of
the genocide with the cohesive experience of securing justice."31 2
5. Justice in Rwanda must have at its basis collective values and
societal responsibilities.
[T]he issue of accountability for violations of human dignity is
ultimately one of human connection. The international law
project is to reconnect the victims, and sometimes even the
perpetrators, to the community, and, in doing so, to reestab-
lish that community and a normative universe in which it can
thrive.3 1 3
A philosophy of personhood that is integral to both Rwandan cul-
ture and restorative justice is ubuntu.3 14 The concept of ubuntu as
personhood is based on the idea that every individual is affected by
the harm of another, and that reactions to harm must be aimed at
restoring that damage.3 1 5 Collective solidarity, conformity to commu-
nity values, compassion, respect, and human dignity are values that
underpin the concept of ubuntu.3 1 6
309. Hopkins, Rwanda supra note 279. See also Johns Hopkins Center for Commu-
nication Programs, Rwandans Turn Out in Force to Elect Gacaca Judges after Commu-
nication Campaign Urges Post-Genocide Reconciliation (Oct. 29, 2001), http://www.
jhuccp.org/pressroom/2001/10-29.shtml.
310. GACACA, supra note 137 (commenting on her hopes for gacaca).
311. See supra Part II. (The support for gacaca comes both from its historical roots
in the community and an intense campaign on the part of the Rwandan government).
312. Daly, supra note 115, at 376.
313. Barbara Stark, After/word(s): 'Violations of Human Dignity' and Postmodern
International Law, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 315, 362 (2002).
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a. Meaningful victim and witness protection mechanisms can help
to achieve justice for women victims of sexual violence by
reducing social stigma and assuming responsibility for harm
within the fabric of Rwandan society.
As discussed throughout the course of this Article, the social
stigma of rape is nearly unfathomably pervasive and extreme in
Rwandan society. Women who have suffered the most severe brutali-
ties, the "crimes worse than death," internalize the shame from those
crimes:
For two days, myself and eight other women were held and
raped by Interahamwe, one after another. Perhaps as many
of twenty of them . . . I tried to leave, but could barely walk
. . . [I] found refuge in an old church... I was in the church
building when the Interahamwe came there . . . One of [the
Interahamwe] sharpened the end of the stick of a hoe. They
held open my legs and pushed the stick into me. I was
screaming. They did it three times until I was bleeding eve-
rywhere. Then they told me to leave. I tried to stand up, but
I kept falling down . . . [I] was taken to a mass grave . . .
organized by a woman [who] cut me immediately behind the
knee. [An Interahamwe] took me to the lake. There, he
raped me . . . After the rape I was left alone and naked. I
couldn't walk properly and so I was on all fours. When people
passed me, I sat down and stopped walking so they wouldn't
know that I had been raped because I was ashamed.3 17
In a context where women victims are reluctant to acknowledge
the horrific violence they have suffered, out of shame and a fear of
additional violence, it is imperative that the rule of law protect these
victims as much as possible from suffering additional harm. Strong
victim and witness protection mechanisms are essential to protect
these women and to send a message to the community at large that
sexual violence is serious and that it is not merely an attack against
honor, but rather a violent crime against bodily integrity.3 18
The Victims and Witnesses Protection Programme for the ICTR
has been sharply criticized by members of the international commu-
nity.3 19 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTR provide
the same protections as do the ICTY Rules; however, there is a discon-
317. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 148, at 22-23 (providing
the story of Perpetue, who was twenty years old and living in Runda Commune with her
husband, child, and sister when the violence began).
318. Women2000, supra note 152, at 4.
319. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 148 (offering an
incidental critique of this program); Violence against Women, supra note 143 (address-
ing the shortcomings of this program).
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nect between the de jure rules and their de facto application. 320 Wit-
ness protection rules require a great deal of cooperation between the
local authorities and the Tribunal-cooperation that, as discussed
above, is not always forthcoming on either side.
32 1
Many women have professed reluctance to travel to Arusha to tes-
tify at the ICTR because of a fear of reprisals upon their return.
32 2
Two witnesses who did testify in Arusha, in fact, were killed following
their testimony.3 23 While a Gender Adviser has been appointed in the
office of the Registrar, and while the Victims and Witness Protection
Unit has established a Sexual Assault Team, concerns both among
survivors and within the international community remain strong.32
4
There is a strong sense that these improvements have been in name
only and that witnesses and survivors lack adequate protection both
during the trial and upon their return. 32 5 Pragmatic difficulties pre-
sent problems, as well; relocation of witnesses within Rwanda, for ex-
ample, is problematic because of the closed society.3 2 6 Whether or not
adequate victim and witness protection mechanisms are in place, the
fact remains that there is a perception among potential witnesses that
these mechanisms are insufficient, resulting in fear, and a resultant
dearth of witness testimony. 32 7 Evidence that should be put before
the Tribunal is not, and justice is hindered.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to develop principles underlying a
feminist theory of justice and to apply those principles critically to
specific legal structures and operatives as they relate to justice for wo-
men victims of sexual violence in post-conflict Rwanda.
In this Article, I have sought to develop theory that will analyze
the workings of patriarchy and account for continuity and change over
time. I have sought to develop principles that allow us to think in
terms of pluralities and diversities rather than of unities and univer-
320. ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Feb. 11, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
484 (1994), as revised and amended July 9-10, 1998, UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.13 (1998);
ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, June 29, 1998 (5th Rev.).
321. See supra Part II.A.i.a.1.
322. Violence against Women, supra note 143, at sec. III(A).
323. Id. (addressing VWPU claims that these two deaths were unrelated to their
testimony at the ICTR).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Violence against Women, supra note 143, at sec. III(A) (discussing the fact that
the VWPU has suggested that witnesses may be relocated outside Rwanda, but the in-
ternational community has not responded).
327. See Violence against Women, supra note 143 (discussing the importance of per-
ception among potential witnesses).
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sals. I have sought to develop theory that rejects construction of mas-
culine universals and feminine specificities, and that, most
importantly, is useful and relevant for a legal (and demographic) real-
ity. Finally, I have sought to apply these principles in a real-world
setting to critique legal mechanisms, for it is only in the application of
these principles to real-world situation that we can see their potential
to serve as a foundation for critique-a foundation not built on sand,
but on justice, bare justice, to suit all.
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